Use of combined signals for reactor shutdown signal validation by Lin, Junne Lung
USE OF COMBINED SIGNALS
FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN SIGNAL VALIDATION
by
Junne Lung Lin
Submitted to the Department of Nuclear Engineering in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
May 1994
© Junne Lung Lin 1994
All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute publicly copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author -_ S // 9 
Department of Nuclear Engineering
May 9, 1994
Certified by / - /
(<C ;fjessor Michael W. Golay
Department of Nuclear Engineering
-... - Thesis Adviser
{l~ /3 /
Certified by .
Proiessor David D. Lanning
Department of Nuclear Engineering
Thesis Reader
Accepted by _ ,
Professor Allan F. Henry
Chairman, NE Departmental Committee on Graduate Students
Science
MASSACHUSETS INSTITUTE
OF TECNOLOGY
JUN 0 1994
LIBRARIES
USE OF COMBINED SIGNALS
FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN SIGNAL VALIDATION
by
JUNNE LUNG LIN
Submitted to the Department of Nuclear Engineering on May 6, 1994
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science
Abstract
A Westinghouse 4-loop PWR is chosen for examination in order to demonstrate the
concept of the reactor protection signal validation based upon the effects of systems
interactions. The systems interactions and the occurrence of signals during the postulated
transients are simulated by using the PRISM code [1]. Based upon the results of the
simulations, a set of event-signal matrices corresponding to different plant conditions are
constructed and the signals that will lead a certain automatic reactor shutdown signal in
appearance in each anticipatory event are identified. These leading signals are utilized in
order to validate their associated reactor shutdown signals. Three criteria for the selection of
a leading signal as a validation signal are set forth in order to eliminate the common cause
failures, to minimize the scale of the required RPS circuit modifications, and to affirm the
success of the signal validations for different operational conditions of a nuclear power
plant.
After the selection of the validating signals, it is found that seven reactor shutdown
signals may be validated by using five leading signals. The required RPS circuit
modifications in order to validate reactor shutdown signals based upon the identified
validating-validated signal pairs are proposed . Although some of the processes of
shutdown signal validation may be dependent upon the reactor power level, the work
reported here shows that a single set of signal validation circuits is adequate for use at any
reactor power level. The proposed circuit modification is expected to be simple, effective,
reliable and low-cost.
As an example of the application of the proposed signal validation method in other areas
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where the system interactions can be explicitly identified, the validation of the safety
injection signal arising from MSIV's closure is demonstrated and the required circuit
modifications are proposed.
The importance rankings among the reactor shutdown signals are established based
upon the constructed event-signal matrices. The potential uses of the importance rankings
are also discussed.
Based upon the generally satisfactory results of signal validations as well as of
operational improvements in the work reported here, it is recommended that the signal
validation method based upon system interactions be further investigated more extensively
by using more accurate computer codes.
Thesis Adviser: Michael W. Golay
Professor of Nuclear Engineering
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Nomenclature
A = Alarm
AMSAC = ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry
AOT = Allowed Outage Time
ATWS = Anticipatory Transient Without Scram
B = Control Rod Block
B/H = Backup Heater
BND = Bias and Noise Detection
BOP = Balance Of Plant
C = Close
CLRC = Complete Loss of Reactor Coolant flow
CRDA = Control Rod Drop Accident
CREJ = Control Rod Ejection
Ctrl Rod = Control Rod
Ctrl Rod-D-A = Control Rod-position Deviation-Alarm
CVCS = Chemical and Volumn Control System
D = Deviation
DNB = Departure from Nucleate Boiling
DOBA = Dilution Of Boric Acid during power operation (with rod in manual control )
DSTF = Decrease in Steam Flow (10% turbine load decrease )
DT = Delta Temperature, Temperature Difference between RCS hot leg coolant and RCS
cold leg coolant
EDG = Emergency Diesel Generator
ESF = Engineered Safety Features
FSAR = Final Safety Analysis Report
FWLB = FeedWater Line Break in one loop
H = High
I&C = Instrumentation and Control
IFWF = Increase in FeedWater Flow ( 50% increase in one loop)
INER = Institute of Nuclear Energy Research in Taiwan
ISTF = Increase in Steam Flow ( 10% turbine load increase)
L = Low; Level
LL = (level) Low Low
LOCA = Loss Of Coolant Accident
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LOEL = Loss Of External Load
LOFW = Loss Of FeedWater flow ( feedwater isolation )
Main Stm-P-L-SI = Main Steam-Pressure-Low-Safety Injection
MGCC = Multi-parameter General Consistency Checking
MSIV = Main Steam Isolation Valve
MSIV-C = Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure
MSLB = Main Steam Line Break in one loop
MSVC = Main Steam isolation Valve Closure in one loop
MTBT = Main Turbine Trip without immediately reactor trip
NR = Negative Rate
NRC = The Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States
O = Open
ON = Actuation
OOPV = Opening Of one Pressurizer safety/relief Valve
OOSV = Opening Of Steam safety/relief Valve in one loop
OPDT = Over-Power-Delta-Temperature
OPDT-H-A/B/R = OPDT-H-Alarm/ control rod Block/ turbine Runback
OPDT-H-T = Over-Power-Delta-Temperature-High-Trip
OTDT = Over-Temperature-Delta-Temperature
OTDT-H-A/B/R = OTDT-H-Alarm/ control rod Block/ turbine Runback
OTDT-H-T = Over-Temperature-Delta-Temperature-High-Trip
PEM = Process Empirical Modeling
PHC = Process Hypercube Comparison
PLRC = Partial Loss of Reactor Coolant flow (in one loop)
PORV = Pilot Operated Relief Valve
PR = Positive Rate
PRISM = Pressurized Reactor Interactive Simulation Model
PWR = Pressurized Water Reactor
Pwr = Reactor Power
PZR = Pressurizer
PZR-L-D-A = PZR-L-Deviation-Alarm
PZR-L-H-A = PZR-L-H-Alarm
PZR-L-H-T = PZP-Level-High-Trip
PZR-P-H-A = PZR-P-H-Alarm
PZR-P-H-T = Pressurizer-Pressure-High-Trip
PZR-P-L-A = PZR-P-L-Alarm
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PZR-P-L-T = PZR-P-Low-Trip
PZR-PORV-O = PZR-Pilot Operated Relief Valve-Open
R = Turbine Runback
RCP = Reactor Coolant Pump
RCS = Reactor Coolant System
RCS-F-L-T = Reactor Coolant System-Flow-Low-Trip
RPS = Reactor Protection System
RTP =Rated Thermal Power
RWST = Refueling Water Storage Tank
Rx = Reactor
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B = Rx-Pwr-High-Alarm/ control rod Block
Rx-Pwr-H-T = Reactor-Power-High-Trip
Rx-Pwr-NR-H-T = Rx-Pwr-Negative Rate-High-Trip
Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T = Rx-Pwr-Positive Rate-High-Trip
S = Signal
S/F = Steam/Feedwater
S/F-F-D-A = Steam/Feedwater-Flow-Deviation-Alarm
SG = Steam Generator
SGCC = Single-parameter General Consistency Checking
SG-L-H-T = Steam Generator-Level-High-Trip
SG-L-L-A = Steam Generator-Level-Low-Alarm
SG-L-LL-T = Steam Generator-Level-Low Low-Trip
SGTR = Steam Generator Tube Rupture in one loop
SI = Safety Injection
T = Trip
Tavg = RCS Coolant Average Temperature
Tavg/Tref-D-A = (T average-T reference)-Deviation-Alarm
T/B = Turbine
T/B-T = Turbine-Trip
Tref = Turbine First Stage Reference Temperature
UCRW = Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal
W = Westinghouse Electric Co.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Over the last 15 years, unplanned automatic reactor shutdowns have been the subject of
increased attention in the nuclear power industry. When automatic reactor shutdowns
occur, they frequently are followed by undesirable thermal and hydraulic transients that
actuate other safety systems. In addition to the undesired stresses upon equipment and
challenges to safety systems of nuclear power plants, a reduction in the margin of safety as
well as a loss of plant availability both occur because of these events.
The economic loss due to an unplanned automatic reactor shutdown is estimated to be
about $ 2 million for a 1000 MWe plant for a two-day off-line period, while the reduction
of nuclear safety is very difficult to quantify. This estimation is based upon the assumption
that the root cause of the automatic shutdown is clear and that there are no special safety
concerns identified by the necessary investigations, and that the nuclear power plant
resumes its full power operation two days after its shutdown. If the nuclear safety after the
automatic shutdown is in doubt, then the investigations and actions required to clarify the
safety concerns will always impose a much more serious financial penalty upon the utility
than will the automatic reactor shutdown itself. The average annual capacity factor loss due
to automatic reactor shutdown resulting from spurious reactor protection system (RPS)
signals, for example, was only 0.17% in 1985 and 1986 for the U.S. commercial nuclear
power plant. However, they contributed an additional 4.84% due to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) investigations [2]. The unplanned automatic reactor shutdowns would
not necessarily result in an NRC investigation, but most of the extended outages followed
transient events that were analyzed by NRC incident investigation teams.
Over the last 10 years, the nuclear power industry has made considerable progress in
continuing to reduce unplanned automatic reactor shutdowns. For example, in 1980 there
were an average of 7.4 unplanned automatic reactor shutdowns per unit per 7000 critical
hours at U.S. nuclear power generating unit. This average decreased to 1.2 in 1990.
However, the trend of the reduction of unplanned automatic reactor shutdown has leveled
off since 1990, with the said average, having values 1.2, 1.3, and 1.1 for 1990, 1991, and
1992, respectively, being essentially unchanged over that interval [3].
Among the remaining unintended reactor shutdowns, about 15% of them were
attributed to spurious signals in the RPS [4]. As the operating plants age, it is expected that
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the spurious signals in the RPS (as well as in other systems) will become more important in
causing unintended reactor shutdowns. Therefore shutdown signal validation may play an
increasingly important role in reducing the number of unplanned reactor shutdown in the
future.
In the work reported here, use of combined signals based upon system interactions for
reactor shutdown signal validation is proposed in order to validate the automatic reactor
shutdown demands. Other signal validation technologies currently used in nuclear power
plants are also discussed and compared with the proposed methodology.
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Chapter 2: Signal Validation Technologies Used in the
Nuclear Power Industry
Research in the area of signal validation has been extensive. Initial research centered on
the most obvious method of signal validation, that of using redundant signals for a given
parameter to check for inter-signal consistency [5]. This methodology was quickly
expanded to the addition of analytical redundancy and empirical redundancy for the
detection of common-cause failures [6]. Current signal validation techniques have been
applied on a demonstration basis at experimental reactor as well as commercial nuclear
power plants. Signal validation has recently been incorporated into digital reactor control
and protection systems. Although the new designed digital control and protection systems
have been proposed to be the major instrumentation and control (I & C) for advanced
nuclear power reactors, however, they have not been widely applied in the existing nuclear
power plants.
This chapter first discusses the signal validation techniques, points out their merits,
limitations, and the reasons why they have not been widely used in the existing plants, then
briefly discusses the signal validation technique based upon systems interactions proposed
here. A method for use of combined signals for reactor shutdown signal validation is
systematically developed in Chapter 3 as an example of signal validation based upon
system interactions.
2. 1 Current Signal Validation Techniques in Use
Currently, at least the following basic signal validation methodologies have been
applied to nuclear power plants:
1. Single-parameter generalized consistency checking (SGCC) for redundant
measurements [7].
2. Multi-parameter generalized consistency checking (MGCC) for use with
simultaneous validation of redundant measurements of multiple parameters and for
common-mode failure detection [8].
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3. Process empirical modeling (PEM) to detect measurement system drift [9, 10, 11].
4. Process hypercube comparison (PHC) for plantwide signals monitoring [12].
5. Bias and noise detection (BND) for basic signal changes [13].
A brief description of each of the above techniques is given below.
2.1.1 The SGCC Algorithm
The SGCC algorithm is the most basic signal validation technique in nuclear power
plants. It guides performance of a systematic checking of the consistency among a set of
redundant measurements of a single parameter (for example, the steam pressure at steam
line 1). At time instant t, any two like measurements (direct or analytical) mi (t) and mj(t)
are said to be consistent with each other if
I mi(t)-mj(t) I< di+ dj, (2.1)
where di and dj are the tolerances of the instruments for measuring mi and mj. Whenever
the above equation is not satisfied, an inconsistency index for each measurement is
incremented. A signal is created to indicate the sensor failure when the inconsistency index
for the sensor exceeds a certain value. This algorithm is only applicable to signals having
redundant measurements.
2.1.2 The MGCC Algorithm
The MGCC algorithm is essentially an extension of the SGCC algorithm. In the MGCC
treatment, several modules using the SGCC algorithms are applied simultaneously to
several sets of similar redundant measurements, e.g., the steam pressure at steam line 1, 2,
3, and 4, one for each line. A complex logic performs the evaluation of the cumulative
inconsistency indices of all the parameters. The simultaneous consistency checking within
one redundant measurement set, and the cross-checking among redundant measurement
sets of similar parameters, results in an algorithm capable of detecting and isolating bias
and calibration errors and the more complex common-mode degradation of instrument
channels. This algorithm is also only applicable to signals with redundant measurements.
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2.1.3 The PEM Algorithm
In the PEM algorithm, the process parameters are predicted either by physical modeling
or by empirical modeling of a plant subsystem. A certain measured value of a plant
parameter then is compared to the predicted values based upon other measured parameters
in order to determine its correctness. The physical modeling is developed based on the
knowledge of the inter-relations of different system parameters. The empirical models are
basically developed using data from different steady-state operation or using a large amount
of data from the same steady state operation. In actual applications, several physical or
empirical models are needed to be generated, one for each operation regime.
The general form of the empirical modeling is given by
N
y=Co+ I Ci fi(X), (2.2)
i=l
where
y= parameter to be predicted
X= { X1, X2, "', Xm)
= set of input parameters that affect the behavior of y
{ CO, C 1, ."', CN }= set of constant coefficients
{ fi; i=l, 2, *-, N)= nonlinear polynomial terms.
This algorithm normally needs a sophisticated software package for use to gather and
handle a large amount of data, to optimize model selection, and to predict sensor output.
2.1.4 The PHC Methodology
The PHC algorithm basically compares the observed signal set with the pre-established
operational states of a nuclear power plant. The concept behind the PHC is somewhat
similar to the PEM approach except that the PHC makes a plantwide comparison of the
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process parameters, while the PEM treats single parameters. In the PHC algorithm, a
hypercube, or multi-dimensional space, data structure is used to store the historical states of
plantwide parameters of the valid operational conditions. A hypercube cell is the smallest
unit describing a plant state in an n-dimensional space. Each plant parameter is located in
one of the divided intervals and constitutes an entity in the n-dimensional space.
The PHC compares the observed signal set with the stored historical states of the plant
and determines its correctness. For example, consider a system in which only three
parameters (x,y,z) are monitored. Suppose that the signal range of each parameter is
divided into five intervals. Further suppose that the historical states of the plant occupy the
hypercube cells of numbered (1,1,1), (2,2,2), (3,3,3), (4,4,4), and (5,5,5). Now during
the observation consider that a new unobserved state is seen numbered (1,1,5). It is
obvious that both the x and y have been observed together before in this combination but
that z was observed in a different state. Therefore the true state is probably (1,1,1) and
variable z is probably in error. Another example is that of an new unobserved location
(5,2,1), the combination of x, y, z which has not existed before and where no combination
of any two variables can be found in the stored hypercube. The abnormal signal cannot be
identified with a correct plant state in this case.
The hypercube cell size (or resolution) is determined by how the signal ranges of the
plant parameters are divided. Small intervals describe the different operating conditions in
more detail but require a larger number of cells.
The weak point of the PHC method is that the stored plant states may never completely
cover all of the possible operational states. It also needs a high capacity computer to gather,
store, and handle a large amount of data, if fine signal resolution is required. Therefore the
range of application of the PHC method is limited.
2.1.5 The BND Algorithm
A signal is said to have an anomaly if, during steady-state operation, the deviation in
the level of the signal, its root-mean-square value, or its statistical distribution exceeds a
preset tolerance. The anomaly of a signal may be characterized by wideband or single-
frequency noise, bias error, pulse-type error, non-symmetric distribution, or a change in
the signal bandwidth. In the BND algorithm, various signatures, including mean value,
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standard deviation, amplitude probability density function, skewness, kurtoisis, etc., are
computed from high-frequency scanned data samples and compared against specified
threshold values. This algorithm is capable of classifying the signal anomaly into bias,
pulse, or noise type.
This algorithm is not powerful if the data scan rate is less than the signal noise
frequency. On the other hand, if the data scan rate is a high as is needed, only a few signals
can be monitored.
2.2 The Application of the Signal Validation Techniques
The signal validation techniques discussed above might have been successful in
reducing the automatic reactor shutdowns in the existing nuclear power plants, should they
have been applied to the plants. However, these signal validation technologies are not
widely used in the existing nuclear power plants. This may be one of the reasons why the
downward trend of the plant shutdown frequency, as discussed in Chapter 1, has been
leveling off since 1990. The nuclear power plants hesitate to apply the new signal
validation techniques partly because the following reasons:
1. The I&C configuration of a plant is required to be changed substantially, depending
upon the scale of application of a new technique. The plants have to be shut down for
modifications before the new equipment can be put into service.
First of all, signals have to be connected to one or more computers. The verification of
the software for applying the techniques is the second task. After the I & C system
installation, the new added equipment, including the isolation amplifiers, the wires, the
computers, and other components have to be subjected to maintenance. While the benefits
of these changes remain to be seen and are uncertain, the costs of the plant shutdowns and
the subsequent maintenance is not difficult to estimate and are sure. The costs and the
expected benefits of applying a new technique are always a trade-off, and their associated
uncertainties induce caution before any plant changes are to be made.
For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority shut down its two units, Sequoyah units
1 and 2, for 23 days in order to replace the aging analog systems with Westinghouse's
Eagle 21 Process Protection System in 1990 [14]. When the decision has to be made to
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employ a new system, not many plants are willing to or are able to spend such a long time
for plant modifications.
2. Even if the signal validation techniques are applied to the plants, the amount of that
they reduce the frequency of automatic shutdowns is limited by the following cause:
a. Human errors.
b. Component failures causing shutdown signals to be generated.
c. Instantaneous component malfunctions caused by factors which included blown
fuses, water intrusion into the instruments, lightening, and radio interference.
As described earlier, most of those signal validation techniques are intended to detect
signal anomalies, they are designed to indicate signal anomalies during steady-state
operation. Although they can provide an early warning for sensor failures, and thus,
prevent the plant from being automatically shut down, provided that the failures are
rectified in a timely manner, they are not considered reliable enough to block the reactor
shutdowns due to the causes listed above.
2.3 Signal Validation Based upon System Interactions
In the work reported here, a signal validation methodology based upon system
interactions is proposed as an alternative method for signal validation. One of the merits of
the proposed method is that it prevents the unnecessary reactor shut downs, and safety
coolant injections in an on line fashion. As is discussed in Chapter 4, the required circuit
modifications for the proposed signal validation method is expected to be simple, effective
and low-cost. This technique can be used for reducing unintended reactor shutdowns,
unintended safety injections, and for operational improvements in other areas where the
system interactions can be explicitly identified.
2.3.1 System Interactions
A nuclear power plant is made up of many interacting systems, structures, and
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components. An action in one part of the plant leads to the actions in others. Systems
interaction is not a new subject in the nuclear power industry. However, early work on the
study of system interactions stressed the need to ensure their acceptability or to identify the
potential existence of unintended and undesirable interactions [15]. In the work reported
here, system interactions are utilized as a basis for signal validation.
2.3.2 Some Simple Examples of Use of Method Developed Here Exist in
the Operating Nuclear Power Plants
Use of combined signals, based upon system interactions, as a means of signal
validation or incident confirmation actually exists in nuclear power plants. For example, in
Westinghouse pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants, a steam generator (SG) water level-
low low signal (set at 17% of full scale) will shut the reactor down. But a SG water level-
low signal (set at 25% of full scale) coincident with steam/feedwater flow-mismatch signal
will also shut the reactor down [16]. The concept behind the latter signal is that even
though the SG water level has only reached 25% of full scale, the associated
steam/feedwater flow-mismatch in the SG will soon lead the component to the 17% of full
scale SG water level- low low setpoint.
Another example found in Westinghouse PWR plants is the use of the refueling water
storage tank (RWST) water level-low low signal combined with safety injection (SI)
actuation signal. This combined signal automatically switches the low-pressure SI pump
suctions from the RWST to the containment sump as the sources of water [16]. The
concept behind this combined signal is straightforward. The SI will lead the RWST level to
decrease and the containment sump level to increase should the plant encounter a loss of
coolant accident (LOCA). The combined signal confirms that a LOCA is occurring and that
the water in the RWST is depleted. However, either the RWST water level-low low or the
SI actuation signal is not adequate to switch the low-pressure pump suction sources.
2.3.3 A Systematic Study
Although the method of signal validation based upon system interactions has been
sporadically used in the nuclear power industry, a systematic study has not yet been
conducted concerning how to utilize it fully.
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In the work described here, use of combined signal for reactor shutdown signal
validation is systematically developed in Chapter 3 as an example of signal validation based
upon system interactions. Since the automatic reactor shutdown signals are the subjects to
be validate, the reactor protection system (RPS), in which the reactor shutdown signals are
generated, is first discussed.
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Chapter 3: The Reactor Shutdown Signal. Validation
Based on System Interactions
This chapter consists of 6 sections. Section 3.1 describes the configuration of the RPS
of a typical Westinghouse PWR, discusses its intended fail-safe design, its vulnerability to
spurious signals or operational errors, and points out that the system interaction may be
engineered to validate a reactor shutdown signal by means of other accompanying signals.
Section 3.2 previews the feasibility of the signal validation with a signal-event matrix based
on the available safety analyses. Section 3.3 introduces the PRISM code [1] which is used
to identify the relations among plant events and plant signals and to establish the event-
signal matrices. Section 3.4 establishes the event-signal matrix based upon results
generated using the PRISM code with all the plant control systems available, sets forth
three criteria for selecting the validating signals, and pre-selects the validating signals based
on the first two selection criteria. Section 3.5 constructs a set of event-signal matrices with
the PRISM, checks the pre-selected validating signals against the third selection criterion
set forth, and concludes by proposing a set of validating-validated signals. In section 3.6,
the validating process and the physical interpretation for each pair of validating and
validated signals is discussed and justified.
3. 1 The Reactor Protection System for Westinghouse PWR
The Reactor Protection System (RPS) for Westinghouse Electric Co. pressurized
water reactors (PWR) monitors numerous system variables such as reactor power level,
system pressure, coolant temperature, in order to ensure the diversity of the protection
function. If any predetermined parameter limit is exceeded during anticipated operational
events, the system initiates a rapid automatic reactor shutdown [16]. The automatic
shutdown prevents the reactor from violating the nuclear fuel design limits and damaging
the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary. It also assists the Engineered Safety
Features (ESF) Systems in mitigating accidents. The fundamental set of parameters to the
RPS for a typical 4-loop Westinghouse PWR is shown in Figure 3.1. The setpoints of the
parameters for automatic reactor shutdown as well as other control and alarm functions are
listed in Table 3.1 [16,17].
The instrumentation of the RPS consists of two redundant trains. Each train is
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Pressurizer- Pressure-High-,
Manual Shutdown
Safety Injection Shutdown
Source Range Nuclear-Flux-
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Shutdown
Turbine Shutdown
Reactor Coolant System-Flow-
Low-Shutdown
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RCS Temperature-Averal
RCS Delta-Temperature
Reactor Coolant Pressure
Figure 3.1. Typical Inputs for Westinghouse-PWR Reactor Protection System
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Table 3.1. Setpoints for Control, Alarm, and Automatic Reactor Shutdown
Normal Value* Setpoint Function
Rx power high
Rx power high
PZR pressure high
PZR pressure high
PZR pressure low
PZR pressure low
PZR pressure low
PZR level high
PZR level high
PZR level deviation
OTDT** high
OTDT** high
OPDT** high
OPDT** high
Steam/Feedwater
flow deviation
Tavg/Tref deviation
S/G level high
S/G level deviation
S/G level low-low
Main steam line
pressure low
Reactor power
negative rate high
100% Rated
100% Rated
15.51 Mpa
15.51 Mpa
15.51 Mpa
15.51 Mpa
15.51 Mpa
58% Full scale
58% Full scale
58% Full scale
100% Rated
100% Rated
100% Rated
100% Rated
0% Rated
within 0.83° C
50% Full scale
50% Full scale
50% Full scale
6.72 Mpa
0% Rated/sec
109% Rated
103% Rated
17.23 Mpa
16.20 Mpa
14.48 Mpa
13.51 Mpa
12.82 Mpa
92% Full scale
70% Full scale
5% deviation
106% Rated
103% Rated
107% Rated
104% Rated
5% deviation
1.1 C deviation
85% Full scale
5% Full scale
17% Full scale
4.14 Mpa
Reactor shutdown
Alarm and control rod block
Reactor shutdown
PZR PORV open
Alarm
Reactor shutdown
Safety injection
Reactor shutdown
Alarm
Alarm
Reactor shutdown
Alarm, control rod block
and turbine run-back
Reactor shutdown
Alarm, control rod block
and turbine run-back
Alarm
Alarm & control rod
movement
T/B shutdown, Rx shutdown
Alarm
Reactor shutdown
Safety injection
5% Rated/2 sec Reactor shutdown
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Table 3.1. Setpoints for Control, Alarm, and Automatic Reactor Shutdown (Continued)
Normal Value* Setpoint Function
Reactor power
positive rate high
0% Rated/sec 5% Rated/2 sec Reactor shutdown
Control rod position 0 step
deviation
RCS flow low 100% Rated 90% Rated Reactor shutdown
*: nominal value at Rated Thermal Power (RTP).
**: the compensated OTDT and OPDT are calculated by:
OTDT: AT (1 + [s) 1 < AToKi- K2 (1+S) [T (1 T + K3(P - P') - f(AI)OD d(1 + 2TS) 1 + T3S T2(l+s) (1 + ,6)
OPDT:
(_+_ s) 1 T[,s 1: 1AT( +) < ATo K4- KS _s 1 T-K6T T' - f2(AI)(1+t2s) L1+T3S J (1+ 7s) L(1+ t6)] (1+ ) '.
Where: AT=measured RCS AT ATO=indicated AT at Rated Thermal Power (RTP)
T=measured RCS Tavg T'=nominal Tavg at RTP
P=measured PZR pressure P'=nominal RCS operating pressure
s= Laplace transform operator
K1=1.09 K2=0.0138/°F K3=0.00067 1/psig
K4 =1.09 K5=0.02/°F for increasing Tavg K6=0.00128/°F when T>T'
0/°F for decreasing Tavg O/°F when T<T'
r1=8sec 2=3sec 3=2sec 4=33sec 5=4sec 6=2sec 7=10sec
fl(AI)=1.26{ 35+(qt-qb)} when qt-qb<-35%
0 when -35<qt-qb <7
-1.05{ (qt-qb)-7 when qt-qb>7
f2(AI)=0
Where qt and qb are percent RTP in the upper and lower halves of the
reactor core,respectively. AI=qt-qb, and qt+qb=reactor total power in %
RTP.
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segmented into four distinct but interconnected modules: the sensors, the signal processors
and bistable setpoint comparators, the voting logic blocks, and the reactor shutdown
circuits. Three or four sensors are shared by the redundant trains to monitor each input
parameter. Each sensor output is connected to its corresponding processor and bistable
setpoint comparator in each train. The processor processes the sensed parameter and the
comparator compares the processed signal with its preset limit for automatic reactor
shutdown. After comparison, the comparator generates a bistable output. This output signal
is positive when the limit is exceeded or negative when it is not. It goes to a two-out-of-
three or two-out-of-four logic signal voting block. If two or more positive, or trip signals
are sensed by the same logic voting block, the block will initiate a rapid automatic reactor
shutdown or other appropriate reactor protection operations. Figure 3-2 illustrates the
instrumentation connections of the system.
Each RPS instrumentation circuit employs a fail-safe design where a signal
malfunction generates a positive signal to the logic voting block. If it is the sensor that is
out of order, as is the situation in most cases, then one positive input to the downstream
voting block corresponding to this sensor will be generated in both redundant logic voting
blocks. Although the two-out-of-three or two-out-of-four logic allows continued operations
with a single circuit being failed while continuing to provide the reactor protection function
using the remaining active sensors, operating in this condition also leaves the reactor
vulnerable to automatic shutdowns due to spurious signals or operator errors.
Since the parameters in the reactor system interact strongly with each other, any
reactor shutdown signal is likely to be closely followed by a related signal during a
transient. The spurious reactor shutdown signals caused by component malfunctions or
operator errors during normal operations will appear alone without any accompanying
signal . However, whenever there is a serious event which should cause reactor shutdown,
there should be also some other accompanying signals generated. It is possible to use the
accompanying signals to validate this reactor shutdown demand. The purpose of the work
reported here is to investigate the generality of this proposition and to evaluate the
practicality of using it as a basis for increasing the plant operational availability.
27
A Train
B Train
Reactor
Signal
Note: Three sensors and two-out-of-threevoting blocks are used when the circuits
are for protection function only. Four sensors and two-out-of-four voting
blocks are used when the circuits are for protection as well as control
functions
Figure 3.2. Typical Instrumentation Connections for Westinghouse-PWR Reactor
Protection System
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3.2 The Event-Signal Matrix Based on the Available Safety
Analyses
An event-signal matrix based on readily available safety analyses has first been
constructed in order to obtain a preliminary insight into the interactions among the system
parameters in different events. The steps for constructing the matrix are fully illustrated
after the following basic information is discussed. The readily available safety analyses for
the survey of this work consists of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the
Maanshan nuclear power station ( a twin Westinghouse 3-loop PWR) [17], seven cases of
accident analysis performed by the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research ( INER ) [19-25],
and some other cases analyzed by Taiwan Power Company [26-28].
The results of these analyses, which are used to construct the event-signal matrix, are
modified to reflect the initial conditions of full power operation. Ideally nuclear power
plants should stay mostly at 100% power operation, and avoiding rapid reactor shutdown
from full power operation is most desirable in terms of economic considerations as well as
for technical reasons such as avoiding thermal-hydraulic impacts, xenon build-up, etc.
3.2.1 The Events for the Event-Signal Matrix
A standard set of safety analyses for a typical nuclear power plant includes about 30
anticipatory events [18]. The event-signal matrices reported here includes 19 events as
follows:
Term Event
IFWF Increase in FeedWater Flow ( 50% increase in one feedwater loop)
ISTF Increase in Steam Flow ( 10% turbine load increase )
OOSV Opening Of Steam safety/relief Valve in one loop
MSLB 100% Main Steam Line Break in one loop
DSTF Decrease in Seam Flow (10% turbine load decrease)
LOEL Loss Qf External Load
MTBT Main Turbine Trip without immediate reactor trip
MSVC Main Steam isolation Valve Closure in one loop
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LOFW Loss Of FeedWater flow ( feedwater isolation )
FWLB FeedWater Line Break in one loop
PLRC Partial Loss of Reactor Coolant flow (in one loop)
CLRC Complete Loss of Reactor Coolant flow
UCRW Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal
CRDA Control Rod Drop Accident
CREJ Control Rod Ejection
DOBA Dilution Of Boric Acid during power operation (with rod in manual control)
OOPV Qpening Qf one Pressurizer safety/relief Valve
SGTR Steam Qenerator Tube Rupture in one loop
LOCA Loss Qf Coolant Accident
Other events not included in the event-signal matrix reported here are omitted for the
reasons in the following. They are discussed subsequently.
1. Reduction in feedwater flow temperature: The results of the transient are similar to
those of the ISTF, but of a reduced magnitude.
2. Main turbine trip with condenser unavailable for steam dump: The transient for this
event has been analyzed in MTBT event.
3. Loss of offsite power event: The development of this event may vary in two ways:
the electrical generator will either shut-down or not. If the electrical generator shuts-down,
the main turbine (T/B) and the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) will immediately follow it to
shut-down, and the reactor will automatically shut-down either on a turbine shutdown
signal or on a RCS low flow signal as analyzed in the MTBT and CLRC events. If the
electrical generator does not shut down, the plant will actually encounter a LOEL event.
Both the cases have been included in the event-signal matrix.
4. Reactor coolant pump rotor seizure (locked rotor): This event is similar to the PLRC
event. There will be no other signals available when the reactor shuts-down on a RCS-
flow-low signal.
5. Startup of an inactive reactor coolant loop at an incorrect temperature: This event can
only happen with one RCP out of service and is allowed only when the reactor power is
less than 30%. This is beyond our interest in the work reported here.
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6. Other events such as fuel handling accident, etc.: These events are not related to the
power operation of a reactor. They have no effect upon reactor shutdown signals.
3.2.2 The Signals for the Event-Signal Matrix
The event-signal matrices reported here include 26 signals as follows:
Term Definition
OTDT-H-T
OTDT-H-A/B/R
OPDT-H-T
OPDT-H-A/B/R
Rx-Pwr-H-T
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B
PZR-P-H-T
PZR-P-H-A
PZR-P-L-T
PZR-P-L-A
PZR-L-H-T
PZR-L-H-A
PZR-L-D-A
PZR-PORV-O
S/F-F-D-A
Tavg/Tref-D-A
SG-L-LL,-T
SG-L-L-A
SG-L-H-T
Main Stm-P-L-SI
Rx-Pwr-NR-H-T
Rx-Pwr-PIR-H-T
Ctrl Rod- D-A
RCS-F-L-T
MSIV-C
T/B-T
Qver-Temperature-Delta-Temperature-High-rip
OTDT-H-Alarm/ control rod Block/ turbine Runback
Qver-Power-Delta-Temperature-High-Trip
OPDT-H-Alarm/ control rod Block/ turbine Runback
Reactor(Rx)-Power-High-Trip
Rx-Pwr-High-Alarm/ control rod Block
Pressurizer-Pressure- High-Trip
PZR-P-H-Alarm
PZR-P-Low-Trip
PZR-P-L-Alarm
PZP-Level-High-Trip
PZR-L-H-Alarm
PZR-L-Deviation-Alarm
PZR-Pilot Qperated Relief Valve-Open
Steam/Feedwater-Flow-Deviation-Alarm
i average/T reference-Deviation-Alarm
Steam Generator-Level-Low Low-Trip
Steam Generator-Level-Low-Alarm
Steam Generator-Level-High-Trip
Main Steam-Pressure-Low-Safety Injection
Rx-Pwr-Negative Rate-High-Trip
Rx-Pwr-Positive Rate-High-Trip
Control Rod-position Deviation-Alarm
Reactor Coolant System-_Flow-Low-Trip
Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure
Turhine-Trip
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3.2.3 The Construction of the Event-signal Matrix
The event-signal matrix based on the available analyses is shown as Table 3.2. The
abbreviations for signals are listed underneath the matrix for quick reference. In each
postulated event, the signals which will appear from the beginning of the event up to the
point at which the reactor shutdown signal is generated have been identified based on the
available analyses. The identified signals are then mapped into the event-signal matrix. For
example, in the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event, the reactor will be shutted-
down by the pressurizer-pressure-low-trip (PZR-P-L-T) signal. The leading signals which
will appear before the reactor is shut down are the pressurizer-pressure-low-alarm (PZR-P-
L-A) signal and the pressurizer-level-deviation-alarm (PZR-L-D-A) signal. Then in the
SGTR column of the event-signal matrix, the entity for the shutdown signal PZR-P-L-T is
marked as "X", and the entities for the leading signals PZR-P-L-A and PZR-L-D-A are
marked as "O". This column then represents the results that in a SGTR event, the reactor is
shutdown by the PZR-P-L-T signal, and the PZR-P-L-A and PZR-L-D-A signals will be
generated before the reactor has been shut down. The "A" in the matrix means that the
reactor may be shut down by signals other than "X".
3.2.4 The Observed System Interactions Based upon the Constructed
Event-Signal Matrix
From the established event-signal matrix, it is observed that some reactor shutdown
signals are always accompanied by other signal(s). For example, OTDT-H-T is always
accompanied by Tavg/Tref-D-A; OPDT-H-T always comes along with Rx-Pwr-H-A/B;
PZR-P-H-T is closely followed by PZR-L-H-A; S/G-L-LL-T has never appeared alone
without the presence of S/F-F-D-A; and Ctrl Rod-D-A has never failed to lead Rx-Pwr-
NR-T, etc. This review strongly suggests that one signal can be used to validate another
during the transients. Typical results are shown in Table 3.2.
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TABLE 3.2: EVENT-SIGNAL MATRIX Based upon Available Safety Analyses
EVENTS I I O MD L MML F PC U CC DO S L
F S OS SO SOW L C RR O G O
WT S LT E B VF L R R R DE B P TC
SIGNALS F V B F L TCWB CCW AJ AV R A
OTDT-H-T AA AA A A X
OTDT-H-A/B/R OO00O O O O 
OPDT-H-T A A A A
OPDT-H-A/B/R 010 0 0
Rx-Pwr-H-T AA A X
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B 0 O O O 0 0
PZR-P-H-T X A
PZR-P-H-A 0 O O 0
PZR-P- L-T XXX
PZR-P-.L-A 0O O O
PZR-L-H-T A A A A
PZR-L-H-A 0 O O 0 OPZR-L-D-A 0 0O
PZR-PORV-O OS/F-F-D-A 0 0 0 
Tavg/Tref-D-A OO O O O O O
SG-L-LL-T XX 
SG-L-L-A OO
SG-L-H-T X
Main Stm-P-L-SI O_ A
Rx-Pwr-NR-T X
Rx-Pwr-PR-T X
Ctrl Rod-D-A 0 O
RCS-F-L-T X X
MSIV-C O O
T/B-T X XX
Legend:
X: More Likely Trip Signal
O: Accompanying Signal
A: Less Likely Trip Signal
0: Accompanying Signal Occurs in Failure Loop
ABBREVIATIONS:
OTDT: Over-Temp. AT
OPDT: Over-Power AT
Rx-Pwr: Reactor power
PZR: Pressurizer
S/F: Steam/Feedwater
SG: Steam Generator
RCS: Rx Coolant System
RCP: Rx Coolant Pump
MSIV: Main Stm Iso. Valve
-P: Pressure
-L: Level
-F: Flow
-Tavg: RCS Loop Avg Temp
-Tref: T/B Reference Temp.
-H: High
-L: Low
-D: Deviation
-LL: Low Low
-NR: Negative Rate
-PR: Positive Rate
-C: (Valve) Close
-O: (Valve) Open
-A: Alarm
/B: Ctrl Rod Block
/R: T/B Runback
-T: Trip
-SI: Safety Injection
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3.2.5 The Inadequacy of the Event-Signal Matrix Based upon the
Available Safety Analyses
However, the event-signal matrix based on the readily available analyses alone is not
adequate. Most of the available event analyses do not take the functions of the control
systems into account [18-28], while the nuclear power plants normally operate with most,
if not all, of their automatic control systems being operable. The response and the
interactions among the system parameters of a plant with all its automatic control systems
being functional could be quite different from that without all automatic control systems
working. For example, in a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event, the reactor will be
shut down by the pressurizer-pressure-low-trip (PZR-P-L-T) signal when its OTDT-H-
AIB/R control rod block and turbine run-back function is available, but the reactor will be
shut down by the OTDT-H-T signal instead when its OTDT-H-A/B/R function is not
available. This is because that the OTDT-H-A/B/R function is designed to reduce the OTDT
value by blocking the control rods and running-back the turbine. If the OTDT-H-A/B/R
function is not available, the reactor cannot stop the OTDT value from increasing and the
OTDT-H-T shutdown setpoint will be reached before the PZR-P-L-T signal can be
generated. Different combinations of control functions give different scenarios and thus
give different event-signal matrices. In order to factor into the control functions, a complete
set of event-signal matrices for a plant with different combinations of control functions
should be constructed.
The work reported here was performed as a demonstration of proof-of-concept. It is
not intended here to establish a set of definitive event-signal matrices which would apply to
a specific plant. Doing this is a large project, involving heavy reliance upon powerful
computer codes. The Pressurized Reactor Interactive Simulation Model (PRISM)
developed by the Simulation Expert System company was chosen to construct the
necessary event-signal matrices in the work described here. The PRISM program can
closely simulate plant responses, and is a suitable choice for the demonstration.
34
3 3 The Pressurized Reactor Interactive Simulation Model (PRISM)
Simulation Program
The PRISM is an integrated RCS and S/G thermal hydraulic model developed for real-
time simulation for a PWR plant [1]. It incorporates a RCS model derived from the SPK
code [29], a U-tube steam generator model (derived from a horizontal steam generator
model [30]), a point kinetics model, and a graphic-user-interface, all running under the
DOS operating system on an personal computer.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the single-loop representation of the RCS and steam generator
model in the PRISM. The reactor vessel is divided into four control volumes for the upper
and the lower plenum, the reactor core, and the upper head. Each RCS loop consists of
control volumes for the hot leg, the primary side of the U-tube steam generator, and the
cold leg. The pressurizer is presented by a vapor region and a liquid region. The secondary
side of the steam generator consists of three control volumes for the downcomer, the riser,
and the steam dome.
3 3.1 Calculations Performed Using the PRISM Program
The PRISM program allows the user to select at most eleven different malfunctions or
accidents, as follows:
Automatic reactor shutdown
Main turbine trip
Reactor fails to automatic shutdown
Loss of offsite power
Main feedwater isolation
Emergency feedwater isolation
Main steam line isolation ( up to four loops )
Small-break (up to three inches of diameter for each loop) in RCS cold leg
Steam generator tube rupture ( up to three tubes for each steam generator)
Main steam line break ( up to 100% break for each loop)
Main feedwater line break ( up to 100% break for each loop).
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Figure 3.3. Single-loop Nodal Presentation of the RCS and S/G Model in
the PRISM program.
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The PRISM program also provides ten process controllers for the RCS and seven for
balance of plant (BOP) systems for different combinations of control functions The
controllers for RCS can be manipulate to control the following functions or properties:
Control rod drive
Boron concentration
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) charging
CVCS letdown
Pressurizer proportional heaters
Pressurizer backup heaters
Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs)
Safety injection
For the BOP systems, the seven controllers can be used to control the following
components or systems:
Main turbine (turbine control valve)
Condenser steam dump
Main steam isolation valves
Atmospheric steam dump valves
Main feedwater control valves
Feedwater control bypass valves
Auxiliary feedwater control
In addition to the malfunction demands and the controller operations, the input data
file for the PRISM can also be modified to alter or disable the control or protection
functions.
With the demand of plant malfunctions or accidents, the manipulation of the RCS and
BOP controllers, and the modification of the input data file, the PRISM allows the user to
simulate plant responses for a wide variety of conditions ranging from operational
transients to breach of the RCS pressure boundary.
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3 3.2 The Setup of the PRISM
In the simulations performed, the initial reactor power is set at 100% of rated thermal
power (RTP) in each case of simulation with the reactor protection and control settings set
as listed in Table 3.1.
Although the PRISM provides a wide variety of simulations, some anticipatory events
designated in the FSAR have exceeded the normal simulation domain of PRISM. It is
necessary to simulate these events using alternative methods. These events include the
following:
Term Event and its simulation
IFWF 30% feedwater flow increase in one loop (this is the maximum the PRISM
can simulate in 100% power)
ISTF 10% steam flow increase in all steam loops, which is simulated by 10% steam
line breaks in all loops ( the turbine controller in PRISM can only bring the
turbine up to 100% load)
LOEL Loss of external load, which is simulated by turbine shutdown without
reactor shutdown with steam dump in automatic control if not otherwise
specified
CRDA Control rod drop accident, which is simulated by the addition of boric acid in
the RCS
CREJ Control rod ejection, which is simulated by the subtraction of boric acid in the
RCS
LOCA Loss of coolant accident, the break size of which is limited by the PRISM to
less than two inches of diameter in RCS cold leg
During each simulated event, an indication would be given whenever an actuation,
alarm or reactor shutdown signal is generated. The generated signals and their times of
occurrence have been recorded and have served to be the entities of each event-signal
matrix.
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3.4 The Event-signal Matrix Based upon PRISM Results, with All
Control Systems Being Available
3.4.1 The Constructed Event-signal Matrix
The event-signal matrix based on the simulations performed using the PRISM, with all
control systems being available, is shown in Table 3.3. Based upon this event-signal
matrix, it is observed that most of the reactor shutdown signals are accompanied by a
number of leading signals, while some of them have none. For those that have one or more
leading signals, the validation of reactor shutdown signal based on system interactions
seems feasible. However, for those that have no leading signal, such as RCS-F-L-T, the
validation of reactor shutdown signal based on system interactions seems impossible. One
of the eventual purposes of the work described here is to indicate a method for justifying
modification of the RPS logic circuits in the existing plants. It is seen from these results
that the selection of the validating signals from the leading signals for each reactor
shutdown signal can not be arbitrary.
3.4.2 The Criteria for Selecting the Validating Signals
The practical considerations involved in the selection of the validating signals require
that the modifications of the RPS logic circuits based upon the selected validating signals
should be simple, effective, reliable. In addition, the modifications should not adversely
affect the functions of the existing systems.
The criteria set forth for the selection of the validating signals for each reactor shutdown
signal are as follows:
1. The validating signals and the reactor shutdown signal to be validated should be
generated from different sensors, and it would better if were from different areas in the
plant, in order to avoid common-mode-failures. Take the SGTR event as an example again,
although the pressurizer-pressure-low-alarm (PZR-P-L-A) signal always leads the
pressurizer-pressure-low-trip (PZR-P-L-T) signal, it is inadequate to use the PZR-P-L-A
signal to validate the PZR-P-L-T signal. This is because these two signals share the same
sensors and signal processors. Thus, it is likely to have the spurious PZR-P-L-A and the
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TABLE 3.3: The Event-signal Matrix Based upon PRISM Analyses
with All Control Systems Being Available.
EVENTS I IOMDLMML FP C U C C D S L
F OS SO T SO W LLC R RO O
W T S LT E B V F L R R R D E B P T C
SIGNALS F FVBFL TCWBCCW A JAVRA
OTDT-H-T X X
OTDT-H-A/B/R OO O OO O O 
OPDT-H-T
OPDT-H-A/B/R
Rx-Pwr-H-T X
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B O
PZR-P-H-T
PZR-P-H-A 0 O
PZR-P-L-T I X X
PZR-P-L-A OO0
PZR-L-H-T
PZR-L-H-A O 0 
PZR-L-D-A O0O O O 0 O 0 O
PZR-PORV-O O O O O
S/F-F-D-A 0 O O0O 0 0
Tavg/Tref-D-A 00 00 0 0O OO O O O
SG-L-LL-T X X
SG-L-D-A 0 0 O0O 0 0
SG-L-H-T X
Main Stm-P-L-SI O O
RX-PWR-NR-H-T X
RX-PWR-PR-H-T X
Ctrl Rod-D-A 00
RCS-F-L-T XX
MSIV-C O 0
STM-DUMP-V-O 0 0 0
T/B-T X O XI 
Legend:
X: Reactor Trip Signal
O: Accompanying Signal 0: Accompanying Signal Occurs in Failure Loop
Abbreviations:
OTDT: Over-Temp. AT
OPDT: Over-Power AT
Rx-Pwr: Reactor power
PZR: Pressurizer
S/F: Steam/Feedwater
SG: Steam Generator
RCS: Rx Coolant System
RCP: Rx Coolant Pump
MSIV: Main Stm Iso. Valve
-P: Pressure
-L: Level
-F: Flow
-Tavg: RCS Loop Avg Temp
-Tref: T/B Reference Temp.
-H: High
-L: Low
-D: Deviation
-LL: Low Low
-NR: Negative Rate
-PR: Positive Rate
-C: (Valve) Close
-O: (Valve) Open
-A: Alarm
/B: Ctrl Rod Block
/R: T/B Runback
-T: Trip
-SI: Safety Injection
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PZR-P-L-T signals simultaneously. Of course we cannot use the false PZR-P-L-A signal to
"validate" the false PZR-P-L-T signal. This consideration has largely ruled out the use of
alarm signals which share the same sensors with the reactor shutdown signals.
2. Whenever there is a common leading signal for different reactor shutdown signals, it
should be preferentially chosen for validation use in order to reduce the scale of circuit
modifications as well as the eventual operating costs. For example, in the last two columns
of the matrix of Table 3.3, the PZR-L-D-A signal as well as the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal can
be selected to validate the PZR-P-L-T shutdown signal in the SGTR and LOCA events.
These two signals do not share the same sensors with the PZR-P-L-T signal. However, the
Tavg/Tref-D-A signal appears on the event-signal matrix more frequently than does the
PZR-P-L-A. It also has the potential to validate the OTDT-H-T and the Rx-Pwr-H-T
shutdown signals in other events. Therefore we should choose the Tavg/Tref-D-A instead
of the PZR-L-D-A to validate the PZR-P-L-T signal.
3. The validating signals chosen based on Table 3.3, the event-signal matrix for all
control functions being available, should survive every credible operational condition of the
plant. That is, a signal cannot be used as a validating signal unless it precedes the reactor
shutdown signal which it is to validate no matter what the combination of the control
functions of the plant may be.
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3.4.3 The Pre-selected Validating-Validated Signal Pairs
The pre-selected validating signals according to the first two rules described above are
highlighted in squares in the same column of matrix shown in Table 3.4, and also are listed
as follows:
Validating si2nal
Steamlfeedwater-flow-deviation-
alarm (S/F-F-D-A)
TavgfTref-deviation-alarm
(Tavg/Tref-D-A)
Control rod-deviation-alarm
(Ctrl Rod-D-A)
Reactor shutdown signal (to be validated)
Steam generator-level-high-trip
(S/G-L-H-T) ,or
Steam generator-level-low low-trip
(S/G-L-LL-T)
Over-temperature-delta-temperature-
high-trip (OTDT-H-T),or
Reactor-power-high-trip
(Rx-Pwr-H-T) ,or
Pressurizer-pressure-low-trip
(PZR-P-L-T)
Reactor-power-positive rate-high-trip
(Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T),or
Reactor-power-negative rate-high-trip
(Rx-Pwr-NR-H-T)
Note that the reactor shutdown on turbine shutdown (T/B-T) signal is excluded from
this list. The T/B-T signal can be generated in the secondary system as well as in the
primary system in order to protect the turbine itself in most cases. Including the T/B-T
signal will involve the analyses for the secondary system. This is beyond our interest at this
moment. Note again that the RCS-flow-low-trip (RCS-F-L-T) signal is not included in this
matrix for there is no leading signal for it.
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TABLE 3.4 : The Pre-selected Accompanying Signals for Different Reactor
Shutdown Signals Based upon PRISM Analyses with All Control
Systems Being Available
EVENTS I IOM D L M MLF P C U C C D OS L
F S O S T S O W L L C R R O
WT S LT EB VF L R R R DE B P T C
SIGNALS F V B F LT C WB C C W A J A V RA
OTDT-H-T XI
OTDT-H-A/B/R O0O O 0 O
OPDT-H-T
OPDT-H-A/B/R
Rx-Pwr-H-T
Rx-Pwr-H-AIB O
PZR-P-H-T
PZR-P-H-A 0 O
PZR-P-L-T
PZR-P-L-A 00
PZR-L-H-T
PZR-L-H-A 0 0
PZR-L-D-A OO O O O O 1
PZR-PORV-O O O O O
S/F-F-D-A I O O O- 
Tavg/Tref-D-A O 0 0 0 11 011
SG-L-LL-T Xll X
SG-L-D-A 0 0 OO O0
SG-L-H-T 
Main Stm-P-L-SI O O
RX-PWR-NR-H-T
RX-PWR-PR-H-T II 
Ctrl Rod-D-A 010
RCS-F-L-T X X
MSIV-C 0 0 
STM-DUMP-V-O OO O
T/B-T X O X
Lengend:
X: Reactor Trip Signal;
O: Accompany Signal;
Abbreviation:
OTDT: Over-Temp. AT
OPDT: Over-Power AT
Rx-Pwr: Reactor power
PZR: Pressurizer
S/F: Steam /Feedwater
SG: Steam Generator
RCS: Rx Coolant System
RCP: Rx Coolant Pump
MSIV: Main Stm Iso. Valve
0: Accompany Signal Occurs in Failure Loop
-P: Pressure
-L: Level
-F: Flow
-Tavg: RCS Loop Avg Temp
-Tref: T/B Reference Temp.
-H: High
-L: Low
-D: Deviation
-LL: Low Low
-NR: Negative Rate
-PR: Positive Rate
-C: (Valve) Close
-O: (Valve) Open
-A: Alarm
/B: Ctrl Rod Block
/R: T/B Runback
-T: Trip
-SI: Safety Injection
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3.5 The Event-signal Matrices without All Control Systems Being
Available
As is described earlier, the pre-selected validating signals for a certain reactor shutdown
signal have to survive every credible plant situation. We have to construct different event-
signal matrices for different combinations of control functions availability of the plant, and
check whether the pre-selected validating signals are still leading their corresponding
shutdown signals in appearance in each event-signal matrix.
3.5.1 The Different Combinations of the Control Systems Availabilities
Normally, continued operation at power of a nuclear power plant with some of its
automatic control functions being disabled is not prohibited by its technical specifications,
since the FSAR does not assume that they will be functional. On the other hand, a nuclear
power plant is not allowed to operate at power continually if any one of its credible systems
or components, which the FSAR assumes to be operable, is in reality inoperable.
Therefore, for a nuclear power plant to operate at power with some control systems
inoperable is credible, while operation with any accredited system being inoperable is
highly unlikely .
The FSAR normally does not assume the automatic control systems to be operable
[18], therefore their failures have to be considered for the purpose of signal validation. The
control functions which are performed by the automatic control systems are as follows:
OTDT-H-A/B/R control rod block and turbine run-back function
OPDT-H-A/B/R control rod block and turbine run-back function
RX-PWR-H-AIB control rod block function
Control rod automatic control
Automatic steam dump control
Automatic PZR PORV control
Automatic PZR pressure (spray and heaters) and level controls
S/G water level control ( feedwater control)
Since the OPDT-H-A/B/R signal is not triggered under the condition of Table 3.3, we
see that disabling the OPDT-H-A/B/R control rod block and turbine run-back functions will
44
not affect the plant behavior at all. Therefore the malfunction of the OPDT-H-A/B/R control
functions have been excluded from discussion here. The S/G water level control has also
been excluded from discussion because the feedwater control valves employ a fail-close
design. The fail-closed feedwater valves isolate the main feedwater from being pumped into
the S/G. This is essentially a loss of feedwater event (LOFW) and has already been
considered in the event-signal matrices. Therefore the operability of the S/G water level
control is not considered here. The operability of the six remaining control functions are
expected to affect the plant responses during a transient. Although there are other
combinations of the system operability which could be considered, only six event-signal
matrices, Tables 3.5 to 3.10, have been established as a demonstration of the necessary
analyses. The first four matrices correspond to one control system being inoperable each,
the fifth corresponds to the inoperability of the PZR pressure and level control systems,
and the last one corresponds to most of the control systems being disabled. The matrices
and the plant conditions they are based on are self-explanatory by their titles, as follows:
Table 3.5. The Event-signal matrix based upon PRISM analyses without the OTDT-H-
A/B/R control functions being available
Table 3.6. The Event-signal matrix based upon PRISM analyses without the Rx-PWR-
H-A/B control function being available
Table 3.7. The event-signal matrix based upon PRISM analyses without the automatic
rod control being available
Table 3.8. The event-signal matrix based upon PRISM analyses without the automatic
steam dump control being available
Table 3.9. The event-signal matrix based upon PRISM analyses without the automatic
PZR pressure (PORV, spray, heaters) and level controls being available
Table 3.10.The event-signal matrix based upon PRISM analyses without the automatic
rod, steam dump, PZR pressure (PORV, spray, heaters) and level controls
being available
The entities in these event-signal matrices have been shaded if they are different from
their corresponding entities on Table 3.3, the event-signal matrix based upon having all
control systems available.
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TABLE 3.5: The Event-signal Matrix Based upon PRISM Analyses
without the OTDT-H-A/B/R Control Functions Being Available.
EVENTS I IMD L MML F P C U C C DO SL
FS S O T S O WLLC RR O O GO
WTS L T E B V F L R R R D E B PT C
SIGNALS FFVBFLTCWBCCWAJAVRA
OTDT-H-T __i _ X 'X 
OTDT-H-A/B/R _ Ell X XX 
OPDT-H-T
OPDT-H-A/B/R _i==i
Rx-Pwr-H-T X X
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B _ O =
PZR-P-H-T
PZR-P-H-A 0 0PZR-P-L-T ii__=..= = :-PZR-P-L-A __-_…====
PZR-L-H-T
PZR-L-H-A OO
PZR-L-D-A O O O O = = O OO
PZR-PORV-O OO O O
S/F-F-D-A 0 O OO O0
Tavg/Tref-D-A 0O O O O O 0 i °=- iOi i ii
SG-L-LL-T X X
SG-L-D-A 0 0 0 O 0 0 - -
SG-L-H-T X
Main Stm-P-L-SI _ O O 
RX-PWR-NR-T X
RX-PWR-PR-T X
Ctrl Rod-D-A 0O
RCS-F-L-T XIX
MSIV-C 0 0 
STM-DUMP-V-O 0 0 O
T/B-T X OX
Legend:
X: Reactor Trip Signal;
0: Accompany Signal; 0: Accompany Signal Occurs in Failure Loop
Abbreviation:
OTDT: Over-Temp. AT
OPDT: Over-Power AT
Rx-Pwr: Reactor power
PZR: Pressurizer
S/F: Steam/Feedwater
RCS: Rx Coolant System
RCP: Rx Coolant Pump
MSIV: Main Stm Iso. Valve
-P: Pressure
-L: Level
-F: Flow
-Tavg: RCS Loop Avg Temp
-H: High
-L: Low
-D: Deviation
-LL: Low Low
-NR: Negative Rate
-PR: Positive Rate
-C: (Valve) Close
-O: (Valve) Open
/B: Ctrl Rod Block
/R: T/B Runback
-T: Trip
-SI: Safety Injection
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TABLE 3.6: The Event-signal Matrix Based upon PRISM Analyses without
the Rx-Pwr-H-A/B Control Function Being Available
EVENTS I I O D M ML F P C U C C DOS LF SO S SOT SO W L CRRO O G 
WT S L T E B V F L R D E B P T C
SIGNALS F F V B F L T C WB C C W AJ AV R A
OTDT-H-T I X _ xx
OTDT-H-A/B/R 00 O OO 01010
OPDT-H-T
OPDT-H-A/BR _
Rx-Pwr-H-T _
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B 
PZR-P-H-T
PZR-P-H-A 0 0
PZR-P-L-T X X
PZR-P-L-A OO0
PZR-L-H-T
PZR-L-H-A 0 0
PZR-L-D-A O0O O O O O O
PZR-PORV-O O O O 
S/F-F-D-A 0 0 0 0 0 
Tavg/Tref-D-A OO O O O O O O O O
SG-L-LL-T X X
SG-L-D-A 0 0 0 O0O 00
SG-L-H-T X
Main Stm-P-L-SI O O
Rx-Pwr-NR-T X
Rx-Pwr-PR-T X
Ctrl Rod-D-A OO
RCS-F-L-T XX
MSIV-C O _0
STM-DUMP-V-O O 0 OO
T/B-T X OX
Legend:
X: Reactor Trip Signal;
O: Accompanying Signal; 0: Accompanying Signal Occurs in Failure Loop
Abbreviation:
OTDT: Over-Temp. AT
OPDT: Over-Power AT
Rx-Pwr: Reactor power
PZR: Pressurizer
S/F: Steam/Feedwater
SG: Steam Generator
RCS: Rx Coolant System
RCP: Rx Coolant Pump
MSIV: Main Stm Iso. Valve
-P: Pressure
-L: Level
-F: Flow
-Tavg: RCS Loop Avg Temp
-Tref: T/B Reference Temp.
-H: High
-L: Low
-D: Deviation
-LL: Low Low
-NR: Negative Rate
-PR: Positive Rate
-C: (Valve) Close
-O: (Valve) Open
-A: Alarm
/B: Ctrl Rod Block
/R: T/B Runback
-T: Trip
-SI: Safety Injection
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TABLE 3.7: The Event-signal Matrix Based upon PRISM Analyses
without the Automatic Rod Control Being Available
EVENTS I I O DL MML F P C U C C D SLFSOSSOT SOWL L CRROOGO
WT S LT E B V F L RRR DE B P T C
SIGNALS F F V B F L T CWB CCWAJ AV RA
OTDT-H-T X XX x ?x X X
OTDT-H-A/B/R OO 0 O O O OO 
OPDT-H-T
OPDT-H-A/B/R
Rx-Pwr-H-T X
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B 0
PZR-P-H-T
PZR-P-H-A 10 0
...... . .. ....
PZR-P-L-T ......PZR-P-L-A ::i:?:i
PZR-L-H-T
PZR-L-H-A 0 0
PZR-L-D-A 0 00 0 0 0 0 0
PZR-PORV-O OO O O 1:
S/F-F-D-A 0 O O 00
Tavg/Tref-D-A OO O OO O O O0 0 OO
SG-L-LL-T X X
SG-L-D-A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0o
SG-L-H-T X
Main Stm-P-L-SI O O
Rx-Pwr-NR-T X
Rx-Pwr-PR-T X
Ctrl Rod-D-A O O
RCS-F-L-T XX
MSIV-C 0 0
STM-DUMP-V-O O 0O
T/B-T X OX
Legend:
X: Reactor Trip Signal
O: Accompanying Signal 0: Accompany Signal Occurs in Failure Loop
Abbreviation:
OTDT: Over-Temp. AT
OPDT: Over-Power AT
PZR: Pressurizer
S/F: Steam/Feedwater
SG: Steam Generator
RCS: Rx Coolant System
RCP: Rx Coolant Pump
MSIV: Main Stm Iso. Valve
-P: Pressure
-F: Flow
-Tavg: RCS Loop Avg Temp
-Tref: T/B Reference Temp.
-H: High
-L: Low
-D: Deviation
-LL: Low Low
-NR: Negative Rate
-C: (Valve) Close
-O: (Valve) Open
-A: Alarm
/B: Ctrl Rod Block
/R: T/B Runback
-T: Trip
-SI: Safety Injection
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TABLE 3.8: The Event-signal Matrix Based upon PRISM Analyses without
the Automatic Steam Dump Control Being Available
EVENTS I I O M D L MMLF P C U C C D S L
F S O S OTS W L L C R RO O G O
WT S L T E B VF L RRR DE B P T C
SIGNALS FF V B F L TCWB CCWAJ AV RA
OTDT-H-T XX
OTDT-H-A/B/R O O O O 0O0
OPDT-H-T
OPDT-H-A/B/R
Rx-Pwr-H-T X
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B O
PZR-P-H-T
PZR-P-H-A 0 O
PZR-P-L-T X X
PZR-P-L-A O010
PZR-L-H-T
PZR-L-H-A = _:??: ii.i. - =_:.
PZR-L-D-A O0O O O O O O
PZR-PORV-O 0 O O O O
S/F-F-D-A 0 0 O 0 0 0 O
Tavg/Tref-D-A _OO O O O O O O O
SG-L-LL-T :iX X X x
SG-L-D-A 0 0 O0O 0 
SG-L-H-T X
Main Stm-P-L-SI O O
Rx-Pwr-NR-T X
Rx-Pwr-PR-T X
Ctrl Rod-D-A O O
RCS-F-L-T X X
MSIV-C O 0
STM-DUMP-V-O -: ......
T/B-T X OX
Legend:
X: Reactor Trip Signal
O: Accompanying Signal 0: Accompany Signal Occurs in Failure Loop
Abbreviation:
OTDT: Over-Temp. AT
OPDT: Over-Power AT
Rx-Pwr: Reactor power
PZR: Pressurizer
S/F: Steam/Feedwater
SG: Steam Generator
RCS: Rx Coolant System
RCP: Rx Coolant Pump
MSIV: Main Stm Iso. Valve
-P: Pressure
-L: Level
-F: Flow
-Tavg: RCS Loop Avg Temp
-Tref: T/B Reference Temp.
-H: High
-L: Low
-D: Deviation
-LL: Low Low
-NR: Negative Rate
-PR: Positive Rate
-C: (Valve) Close
-O: (Valve) Open
-A: Alarm
/B: Ctrl Rod Block
/R: T/B Runback
-T: Trip
-SI: Safety Injection
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TABLE 3.9: The Event-signal Matrix Based upon PRISM Analyses without the
Automatic PZR Pressure (PORV,Spray,Heater) and Level Control
Control Being Available.
EVENTS I I MD L MML F P C U C C D O S L
F S OS S T S WLLC RROOGO
WT S L T E B V F L R R R D E B P T C
SIGNALS FFVBFLTCWBCCWAJAVRA
OTDT-H-T X X
OTDT-H-A/B/R 010 0 10 010O
OPDT-H-T
OPDT-H-A/B/R
Rx-Pwr-H-T X
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B O
PZR-P-H-T X X X
PZR-P-H-A 0 0 0 O
PZR-P-L-T XX
PZR-P-L-A OO
PZR-L-H-T
PZR-L-H-A
PZR-L-D-A __00 = 0 0 0 0
PZR-PORV-O 0 O O
S/F-F-D-A 0 O 0 O 0O
Tav/Tref-D-A OO OOO O O OOOO
SG-L-LL-T ____ X
SG-L-D-A 0 0 OO 0 
SG-L-H-T X
Main Stm-P-L-SI O O
Rx-Pwr-NR-T X
Rx-Pwr-PR-T X
Ctrl Rod-D-A O O
RCS-F-L-T X X
MSIV-C O 0
STM-DUMP-V-O O 010 
T/B-T X OX
Legend:
X: Reactor Trip Signal
O: Accompanying Signal 0: Accompany Signal Occurs in Failure Loop
Abbreviation:
OTDT: Over-Temp. AT
OPDT: Over-Power AT
Rx-Pwr: Reactor power
PZR: Pressurizer
S/F: Steam/Feedwater
SG: Steam Generator
RCS: Rx Coolant System
RCP: Rx Coolant Pump
MSIV: Main Stm Iso. Valve
-P: Pressure
-L: Level
-F: Flow
-Tavg: RCS Loop Avg Temp
-Tref: T/B Reference Temp.
-H: High
-L: Low
-D: Deviation
-LL: Low Low
-NR: Negative Rate
-PR: Positive Rate
-C: (Valve) Close
-O: (Valve) Open
-A: Alarm
/B: Ctrl Rod Block
/R: T/B Runback
-T: Trip
-SI: Safety Injection
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TABLE 3.10: The Event-signal Matrix Based upon PRISM Analyses
without Automatic Rod, Steam dump, PZR Pressure
(PORV, Spray, Heater) and Level Controls Being Available.
EVENTS I I OM D L M M L FP C UC C D OSL
F S O S S O T S O W LL C R R G 
W T S L TE B V F L R R R D E B P TC
SIGNALS F V B L WB CCWA A V R A
OTDT-H-T -- I ...... x x
OTDT-H-A/B/R O00 0 ::I o O
OPDT-H-T
OPDT-H-A/B/RRx-Pwr-H-T : : : l1
Rx-Pwr-H-A/B il..
PZR-P-H-T i! X X X X Xii
PZR-P-H-A O 00 '1 0 [0 ' O; ....... ...
PZR-P-L-T
PZR-P-L-A i i !? i ! ! i ' F ?
PZR-L-H-T
PZR-L-D-A ...... 0 00 |..
PZR-PORV-O 1 ** . 111 01 1
S/F-F-D-A 0 0 00 00
Tavg/Tref-D-A O 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0
SG-L-LL-T _-? X
SG-L-D-A 0 o070 O 
SG-L-H-T X
Main Stm-P-L-SI 0 0
Rx-Pwr-NR-T X
Rx-Pwr-PR-T X
Ctrl Rod-D-A 0 0O
RCS-F-L-T XX
MSIV-C O _ 0 0STM-DUMP-V-O _ .- ii 
T/B-T _ X OX
Legend:
X: Reactor Trip Signal;
O: Accompany Signal; 0: Accompany Signal Occurs in Failure Loop
Abbreviation:
OTDT: Over-Temp. AT
OPDT: Over-Power AT
Rx-Pwr: Reactor power
PZR: Pressurizer
S/F: Steam/Feedwater
SG: Steam Generator
RCS: Rx Coolant System
RCP: Rx Coolant Pump
MSIV: Main Stm Iso. Valve
-P: Pressure
-L: Level
-F: Flow
-Tavg: RCS Loop Avg Temp
-Tref: T/B Reference Temp.
-H: High
-L: Low
-D: Deviation
-LL: Low Low
-NR: Negative Rate
-PR: Positive Rate
-C: (Valve) Close
-O0: (Valve) Open
-A: Alarm
/B: Ctrl Rod Block
/R: T/B Runback
-T: Trip
-SI: Safety Injection
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3.5.2 The Conclusive Validating-Validated signal Combinations
From the constructed tables, it is observed that all of the pre-selected leading signals
would have otherwise survived had the OTDT-H-A/B/R control functions not been
disabled. When the OTDT-H-A/B/R control rod block and turbine run-back functions are
removed, the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal is no longer leading the OTDT-H-T reactor shutdown
signal in appearance during the OOPV, SGTR, or LOCA events. If we only use the
Tavg/Tref-D-A signal to validate the OTDT-H-T reactor shutdown signal, the reactor will
not automatically shutdown on the OTDT-H-T signal since the reactor shutdown signal
would be thought a spurious signal in this case. We must search to find another leading
signal in order to validate the OTDT-H-T reactor shutdown signal in this case.
Fortunately, further analysis shows that the pressurizer back-up heaters have never
failed to be actuated before the OTDT-H-T shutdown signal is generated during the OOPV,
SGTR, and LOCA events when the OTDT-H-A/B/R function is disabled. The pressurizer
(PZR) back-up heaters are installed to heat the water in the PZR, and therefore help to
increase the RCS pressure whenever the RCS pressure is below than 15.34 Mpa [17,18].
During the OOPV, SGTR, or the LOCA accidents, the RCS pressure decreases quickly.
The pressurizer back-up heaters are actuated to resist the pressure decrease of the RCS
during these accidents. Therefore we can use the actuation of the PZR back-up heaters as
another validating signal for the OTDT-H-T reactor shutdown signal.
Add the actuation signal of the PZR back-up heaters, denoted as PZR-B/H-ON, for the
validation of OTDT-H-T, we have now a complete set of validating signals for any credible
operation condition. The conclusive result is shown in Table 3.11.
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Table 3.11 The Validating-Validated Signal Pairs Based upon the Selection Criteria
Leading signal Reactor shutdown sienal
Steam/feedwater-flow-deviation-
alarm (S/F-F-D-A)
Steam generator-level-high-trip
(S/G-L-H-T) ,or
Steam generator-level-low low-trip
(S/G-L-LL-T)
Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm
(Tavg/Tref-D-A)
Reactor-power-high-trip
(Rx-Pwr-H-T),or
Pressurizer-pressure-low-trip
(PZR-P-L-T)
Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm
(Tavg/Tref-D-A) or PZR-
B/H-ON
Control rod-deviation-alarm
(Ctrl Rod-D-A)
Over-temperature-delta-temperature-
high-trip (OTDT-H-T)
Reactor-power-positive rate-high-trip
(Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T),or
Reactor-power-negative rate-high-trip
(Rx-Pwr-NR-H-T)
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3.6 The Validating Signals and the Physical Interpretations of the
Validating Processes
3.6.1 The Validation of the Steam Generator-Level-High-Trip or Steam
Generator-Level-Low-Low-Trip signal
The steam/feedwater-flow-deviation-alarm (S/F-F-D-A) signal is proposed to validate
the steam generator-level-high-trip (S/G-L-H-T) or steam generator-level-low-low-trip
(S/G-L-LL-T) signal. This signal validation process is expected to be independent of the
initial power level of the reactor
When the steam flow leaving the steam generator does not match the feedwater flow
entering the steam generator, the steam generator level starts to change after a short period
of level shrinkage or swell. The steam generator level can reach its high-trip setpoint or
low-low-trip setpoint only when its steam flow and its feedwater flow largely deviate from
each other in advance of the level deviation. In fact, the S/F-F-D-A is set to alert the
operators that the steam generator water level may go too high or too low if actions are not
taken to match the two flows.
Since the deviation of the steam and feedwater flows leads the S/G water level to
change, one may use the S/F-F-D-A signal to validate the S/G-L-H-T or S/G-L-LL-T
signals. Also, the reactor power level has played no role in this validation process. This is
desirable as the signal validation should be independent of the initial power level of the
reactor.
3.6.2 The Validation of the Reactor-Power-Hgh-Trip or Pressurizer-
Pressure-Low-Trip Signal
The Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm signal is proposed for use to validate the reactor-
power-high-trip (Rx-Pwr-H-T) and the pressurizer-pressure-low-trip (PZR-P-L-T) signals.
The validation of the Rx-Pwr-H-T by the Tavg/Tref-D-A is expected to be power
independent, but this is not the case for the validation of the PZR-P-L-T.
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3.6.2.1 Use of the Tavg/1Tef-Deviation-Alarm Signal to Validate the Reactor-Power-
High-Tip Signal
The Tavg/Tref-D-A signal is an indication of a power imbalance between the primary
system and the secondary system. The Tref signal is calibrated to be proportional to the
first stage steam pressure in the turbine, and therefore represents the turbine power. The
Tavg variable is equal to the average of the temperatures of the coolant entering and leaving
the reactor core. It is controlled to be within ±0.83°C of the Tref by the reactor control
system. Whenever the power produced by the reactor is higher than the power removed by
the turbine, the Tavg starts to increase. When Tavg is higher than Tref by more than
0.83°C, the control rods are automatically inserted into the reactor core to adjust the reactor
power and bring the Tavg to be within 0.56°C of the Tref. On the contrary, if the reactor
power is lower than the turbine power, the control rods are automatically withdrawn until
the Tavg is brought to be within 0.56°C of the Tref. The Tavg has a span of 17.5°C, from
291.7°C to 309.2°C corresponding to 0% to 100% of rated thermal power (RTP), during
normal power operation. The alarm setting of 1.1°C deviation between Tavg and Tref
corresponds to a power imbalance of about 6.3% of RTP between the primary and the
secondary coolant systems. Thus, the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal essentially indicates that the
reactor power is deviant from the secondary turbine power by at least 6.3% of RTP
[1,17,18].
The Rx-Pwr-H-T value is set at 109% of rated thermal power (RTP). The maximum
power that the turbine in the secondary side is allowed to produce is 100% of RTP. When
the Rx-Pwr-H-T signal occurs, the power deviation between the primary and the secondary
coolant systems will be at least as high as 9%. Therefore the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal will
precede the Rx-Pwr-H-T signal in occurrence in any case.
When the reactor initially operates at a power level less than 100% of RTP, the power
deviation between the reactor and the turbine will be more than 9% of RTP should the Rx-
Pwr-H-T signal appear. In this case the Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm signal will precede the
Rx-Pwr-H-T signal in occurrence by more than that of 100% of RTP. That is, the
validation of the Rx-Pwr-H-T by the Tavg/Tref-D-A is expected to be applicable at any
power level.
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3.6.2.2 he Validation of the Pessurizer-Pe ssure-Low-Trip Signal
The validation of the PZR-P-L-T signal is rather indirect, and is explained as follows.
The PZR-P-L-T signal only appears in the SGTR or LOCA events with the OTDT-H-
A/B/R control function also being operational. In these cases, the decreased pressurizer
pressure engenders the OTDT-H-A/B/R signal earlier because the OTDT-H-A/B/R signal is
very sensitive to coolant pressure decrease, as is discussed in the next section. The OTDT-
H-A/B/R initiates the turbine run-back, a fast turbine power reduction, and thus generates
the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal before the reactor is eventually shut down on the fairly low set
pressure of the PZR-P-L-T signal.
The OTDT-H-A/B/R occurs earlier than does the PZR-P-L-T signal in the
depressurization scenario, and the OTDT-H-A/B/R will immediately stimulate the
Tavg/Tref-D-A signal if the OTDT-H-A/B/R control is functional. Therefore the Tavg/Tref-
D-A signal will precede the PZR-P-L-T signal and corresponding demand for reactor
shutdown.
However, the PZR-P-L-T signal can occur without occurrence of the OTDT-H-A/B/R
signal. As is shown in Table 3.1, the value of OTDT is calculated based upon the reactor
power and RCS pressure. As the reactor power decreases, the value of the OTDT-H-A/B/R
signal decreases also. When the reactor power becomes too low, the low delta-temperature
will instead be generated and will preclude the OTDT-H-A/B/R signal from being
produced. Therefore, the validation of the PZR-P-L-T signal by the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal
is expected to be applicable only when the reactor power exceeds a certain "threshold"
level.
This threshold power level could be established by simulating the SGTR and LOCA
events with the OTDT-H-A/B/R control function being operational with different initial
reactor power levels. The threshold value of the reactor power is that above that power
level where the validation of the PZR-P-L-T signal by the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal is
applicable. That is, above the threshold power the OTDT-H-A/B/R, and therefore the
Tavg/Tref-D-A, will always precede the PZR-P-L-T signal.
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3.6.3 Use of the Pressurizer-Backup Heater-Actuation or the Tavg/Tref-
Deviation-Alarm Signals to Validate the Over-Temperature-Delta-
Temperature-High-Trip Signal
It is proposed here to use the union of the pressurizer-backup-heater-actuation (PZR-
B/H-ON) and the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal to validate the Over-temperature-delta-temperature-
high-trip (OTDT-H-T) signal. The validation process for the OTDT-H-T is expected to be
power independent.
The Over-Temperature-Delta-Temperature (OTDT) initiation value is set to prevent a
high heat flux condition involving the nuclear fuel and the coolant in the Departure from
Nucleate Boiling (DNB) condition. It assures the heat transfer from the nuclear fuel to the
coolant will remain in the nucleate boiling condition and it maintains the fuel temperature in
an acceptable range. Generally speaking, the higher is the reactor power and the lower is
the RCS pressure, the closer is the DNB regime approach. As is shown in Table 3.1, in
practice the OTDT value is calculated such that it has a lower value for a lower RCS
pressure or a higher reactor power. That is, either a low RCS pressure or a high reactor
power (or, high DT) or both can induce the OTDT-H-A/B/R and the OTDT-H-T signals.
3.6.3.1 Use of the Pressunizer-Backup Heater-Actuation Signal to Validate the
Over-Temper-tu-Delta-Tempem -High-Trip Signal
If the OTDT-H-T is originated from low RCS pressure, as it is in the cases of the
OOPV, SGTR, and LOCA events, the depressurization of the RCS will first engender the
PZR-B/H-ON signal. Since the PZR-B/H-ON is set at only 0.138 Mpa below the nominal
RCS pressure of 15.51 Mpa, the PZR-B/H-ON signal will appear in the very beginning of
the depressurization transients. That is, the PZR-B/H-ON signal will well precede the
OTDT-H-T signal if the OTDT-H-T signal is caused by a pressure loss.
If the reactor initially operates at a rather lower power level than 100% of RTP, the
depressurization of the RCS will still cause the PZR-B/H-ON signal. But the OTDT-H-T
signal is less likely to occur when the reactor is at a lower power level. Whether or not the
OTDT-H-T signal will be generated, the PZR-B/H-ON signal will appear in the RCS
depressurization events at any reactor power level. That is, the validation of the OTDT-H-T
signal by the PZR-B/H-ON signal is appropriate for RCS depressurization cases at any
power level.
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3.6.3.2 Use of the Tavgfref-Devialion-Alarm Signal to Validate the Over-Temperatru.
Delta-Tempeture-High-Trip Signal
In cases where the OTDT-H-T is induced from an high reactor power level, the high
power condition will incur the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal, which will precede the OTDT-H-T
signal as is discussed in section 3.6.2.1.
If the reactor initially operates at a rather lower power than 100% of RTP, the
Tavg/Tref-D-A signal will appear fairly early whether the OTDT-H-T will appear or not.
That is, the validation of the OTDT-H-T signal by the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal is appropriate
for any reactor power level, as the manner discussed in the previous section.
3.6.3.3 Use of the Union of the Pressuizer-Backup-Heater-Acmfion Signal and the
TavgfITef-Deviation-Alarm Signal to Validate the Over-Tenperamre-Delta-
Temperature-High-Trip Signal
The PZR-B/U-ON signal alone is not adequate for the validation of the OTDT-H-T
signal, since the RCS will not be depressurized if the OTDT-H-T is incurred at high reactor
power (or, high DT ). The Tavg/Tref-D-A signal alone is not adequate for validation
purposes either. If the OTDT-H-T signal is caused by a low RCS pressure, the Tavg/Tref-
D-A signal will not appear until the turbine is run-back in response to the OTDT-H-A/B/R
signal. The problem is that the OTDT-H-A/B/R control function is not an accredited
function.
However, in any case, either the PZR-B/H-ON signal or the Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm
signal, or both, will precede the OTDT-H-T signal. Consequently, the union of the PZR-
B/H-ON signal and the Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm signal is proposed here for use to
validate the OTDT-H-T signal. From this discussion it is seen that the validation process is
also independent of the initial power of the reactor.
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3.6.4 Use of the Control Rod-Deviation-Alarm Signal to Validate the
Reactor-Power-Positive Rate-High-Trip and the Reactor-Power-
Negative Rate-High-Trip Signals
The reactor-power-positive rate-high-trip (Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T) provides departure from
nucleate boiling (DNB) protection against control rod ejection accidents, while the reactor-
power-negative rate-high-trip (Rx-Pwr-NR-H-T) protects against control rod drop
accidents.
The control rods for a Westinghouse PWR plant are designed to move in pre-selected
banks, and the banks are to move in a pre-selected sequence. Each bank of the control rods
is divided into two groups of two or four rods each. The two groups in a bank move
sequentially such that the first group is always within one step of the second group in the
bank. Deviation of any control rod from its group by more than 12 steps will initiate the
control rod-deviation-alarm (Ctrl rod-D-A) signal. If the rod deviation alarm is not
operable, the operator is required to take action as required by the technical specifications.
Should a control rod eject or drop, the Ctrl rod-D-A signal will first be initiated before
the Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T or the Rx-Pwr- NR-H-T signal is generated. Consequently, the
control rod-deviation-alarm signal could validate these two reactor shutdown signals. This
signal validation process is expected to be power level independent.
In the past reactor shutdowns have occurred due to the Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T signal arising
from the rapid RCS cooldown during the load rejection events [31]. The rapid RCS
cooldown added a large amount of positive reactivity into the core, particularly near the end
of core life when the moderator coefficients of reactivity become strongly negative. The
Japanese PWRs have adjusted their Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T setpoints from 5% to 10% of RTP in
order to avoid this kind of reactor shutdown actuation since the Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T shutdown
signal is designed for use only in rod ejection events. If the signal validation method
proposed here had been employed, the reactor shutdowns could have been stopped as
being unnecessary in the load rejection events without the analyses and the setpoint
adjustment of the Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T signal.
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Chapter 4: The Applications of the Work Reported Here
This chapter discusses three applications of the work reported here. Other potential
applications are discussed in the final chapter.
4. 1 'Trip" Reduction in the Nuclear Power Plants
One of the ultimate applications of the work reported here is to modify the automatic
reactor shutdown logic in the reactor protection system (RPS) in order to reduce the
frequency of unintended automatic reactor shutdowns. In this section, the required
modifications of the RPS logic are proposed based upon the signal validation processes
discussed in Section 3.6. The simplicity and compatibility, the reliability, and the cost-
benefit implications of the modifications are also discussed here.
4.1.1 The RPS Logic Modifications
Although some of the processes for shutdown signal validation may be dependent upon
the reactor power level, the work reported here shows that the same set of validation
signals is adequate for use at any reactor power level. The following discussion first
depicts the RPS signal modifications which would be used for reactors operating at 100%
of rated thermal power (RTP), and then illustrates the use of these signals at power levels
other than 100% of RTP.
4.. 1.1 The Modificatios for Reacltrs Operating at 100% of Rated Ihennd Power
The logic circuitry modifications for the RPS of a Westinghouse-PWR operating at
100% of RTP are proposed as shown in Figure 4.1 (a),(b),(c), and (d) and are discussed
as follows.
Except for the OTDT-H-T signal, each of the other six automatic reactor shutdown
signals, the S/G-L-H-T, the S/G-L-L-T, the Rx-Pwr-H-T, the PZR-P-L-T, the Rx-Pwr-
PR-H-T, and the Rx-Pwr-NR-H-T, may each be validated by a single preceding signal. As
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S/G-Level-High-Trip
(S/G-L-H-T)
(a) * Steam/Feedwater-Flow-
L Deviation-Alarm(S/F-F-D-A)
S/G-Level-Low Low-Trip
(S/G-L-LL-T)
Ractor-Power-High-Trip
(Rx-P-H-T)
(b) * Tavg/Tref-Deviation-Alarm
(Tavg/Tref-D-A)
Pressurizer-Pressure-Low-Trip
(PZR-P-L-T)
fAJiJD Turbine Shutdown
Reactor Shutdown
AND Reactor Shutdown
AND
Over Temp. Delta Temp.-High-Trip
(OTDT-H-T)
(c) * Tavg/Tref-Dev-Alarm
(Tavg/Tref-D-A)
L
Reactor Shutdown
Reactor Shutdown
Reactor Shutdown
PZR-Backup Heater-ON--
(PZR-B/H-ON)
Rx-Power-Positive Rate-High-'
(Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T)
Control Rod-Deviation-Alarm
(Ctrl Rod-D-A)
Rx-Power-Negative Rate-High,
(RY Pwr-NR -H-T)
Reactor Shutdown
Reactor Shutdown
Figure 4.1. Modified RPS logic Circuits for W-PWR operating at 100% of RTP
(a) Use Steam/Feedwater-Flow-Deviation-Alarm signal to validate Steam generator-
Level-High-Trip or Steam generator-Level-Low Low-Trip signal
(b) Use Tavg/Tref-Deviation-Alarm signal to validate Reactor-Power-High-Trip or
Pressurizer Pressure-Low-Trip signal
(c) Use Tavg/Tref-Deviation-Alarm or Pressurizer-Backup Heater-Actuation signal
to validate Over-Temperature-Delta-Temperature-High-Trip signal
(d) Use Control Rod-Deviation-Alarm signal to validate Reactor-Power-Positive Rate-
High-Trip or Reactor-Power-Negative Rate-High-Trip.
* Modified systems input signals are asterisked.
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is shown in Figure 4.1 (a), (b), and (d), a Priority AND gate is added to the existing circuit
for each of the reactor shutdown signals using one single preceding signal. The Priority
AND gate allows the reactor shutdown signal to go to the downstream reactor shutdown
actuation circuits only when its corresponding preceding signal has been presented at the
AND gate. In this case, the reactor shutdown signal is validated by its validating signal. A
reactor shutdown signal without its preceding signal being presented at the AND gate is
treated as a spurious signal and will not be forwarded to the downstream circuits. In this
manner a spurious reactor shutdown could be stopped by the AND gate as being
unnecessary.
For the reactor shutdown signal OTDT-H-T, either the PZR-B/H-ON signal or the
Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm signal alone is not adequate to validate it. But either the PZR-
B/H-ON signal or the Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm signal, or both, will precede the
OTDT-H-T signal in any case, we need the union of the PZR-B/H-ON signal and the
Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm signal to validate the OTDT-H-T signal. In this case, an OR gate
is used to combine the preceding signals Tavg/Tref-D-A and PZR-B/H-ON into a single
validating signal. An Priority AND gate is then added in like manner as discussed above to
validate the reactor shutdown signal OTDT-H-T by means of the combined validating
signal.
4.1.1.2 The NMdifications Needed for Reactors Operating at Power Levels Olher than
100% of Rated Thennal Power
As is discussed in Section 3.6, all but one of the proposed signal validating processes
are expected to be independent of the reactor power level. For those that are independent of
power, i.e., the validations of the S/G-L-H-T, S/G-L-L-T, Rx-Pwr-H-T, Rx-Pwr-PR-H-
T, Rx-Pwr-NR-H-T, and OTDT-H-T signals, the validating circuits as proposed in Figure
4.1 will accomplish the shutdown signal validation for reactors at any power level.
As for the validation of the power dependent PZR-P-L-T signal, a NO gate and an OR
gate can be used. As shown in Figure 4.2.(b), the NO gate serves as an interlock which
generates a positive output to the OR gate when the reactor power is too low to generate the
validating Tavg/Tref-D-A signal. In this condition, the reactor will be shutdown if the PZR-
P-L-T appears alone. This is simply the original shutdown logic. Whenever the reactor
power is greater than the threshold power as defined in Section 3.6.2.2, the NO gate
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Rx-Power-Negative Rate-High.
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Figure 4.2. RPS logic modifications for W-PWR operating at any power level
(a), (c), and (d) are exactly the same as in Figure 4.1.
(b) A NO gate is used to generate a positive output to replace the missing Tavg/Tref-
Deviation-Alarm signal when the reactor power level is less than the "threshold
power" level. When the reactor power is greater than the threshold power, the
NO gate generates a negative output in order to allow the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal
acting as the validating signal.
* Modified systems input signals are asterisked.
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generates a negative output to the OR gate and allows the Tavg/Tref-D-A signal to play a
role in validating the PZR-P-L-T signal. This arrangement avoids requiring a different set
of validating circuits for use at different reactor power level.
4.1.2 The Evaluation of the Logic Modifications
4.1.2.1 Simplicity and Compatibility
The character of the proposed RPS modification is its simplicity. Only eight Priority
AND gates, two OR gates, one NO gate, and some interconnecting wires per RPS train are
required to be used in order to accomplish the needed modifications. Keeping a
modification simple makes the modification itself more reliable than does a otherwise
complicated one.
In a practical design, the electronic components used in these modifications are identical
to those in the existing system. The added components are installed in the spare slots inside
the instrumentation cabinets, therefore the added components essentially do not occupy an
extra space. If this is the case, then the tasks of operation and the maintenance of a
modified system is essentially identical to that required prior to the modification. No special
care has to be taken to maintain the modified system once the modification is completed.
This is one good reason why we suggest modifying the existing reactor protection system
instead of using other signal validation techniques.
4.1.2.2 Reliability Considerations
The required RPS modifications proposed here focus on the elimination of spurious
reactor shutdown signals in order to reduce the number of unintended reactor shutdowns.
Not any signal setpoint for the reactor protection system as well as for the reactor control
system needs to be changed. Therefore the results of the safety analyses for a plant which
implements the proposed RPS modification would remain valid under this process. No
new safety analysis would be needed, except concerning reliability considerations for the
new introduced components.
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Note that three out of the four validating signals identified in the work reported here,
the Tavg/Tref-deviation-alarm,the PZR-backup heater-actuation, and the control rod-
deviation-alarm signals, belong to the reactor control system. Normally, control circuits are
not assumed to be functional for purposes of safety analyses. They are not of the same
safety grade of design as is the reactor protection system. Therefore two typical
considerations have to be addressed in a routine design process to ensure that the use of
instrumentation circuits for the validation of the RPS signals will be highly reliable:
1. The instrumentation circuits of the validating signals should be upgraded to "safety-
related" quality standards. They should meet the requirements set forth in related
documents such as the General Design Criteria, IEEE Standards, etc. That is, they
should have independent and reliable power supplies, separated redundant channels,
on-line test capability, etc.
2. The instrumentation circuits of the modification should also employ a fail-safe
design, where a signal malfunction generates a positive signal to its logic gate. In
this manner, the failures of the validating circuits will not impose an adverse effect
upon the reliability of the existing reactor protection system.
The nuclear industry has much experience and has developed approved approaches for
upgrading components from non-safety grade to safety grade. The first consideration
discussed above is not a new issue and is not expected to be a problem for the RPS
modifications proposed here. The second consideration discussed above is even more
trivial. The existing instrumentation circuits for reactor protection system are already built
from a fail-safe design. Thus, the second consideration is not expected to be a problem,
especially when the electronic components used in the needed modifications are chosen to
be identical to those in the existing system. Involving only three signals and twenty two
logic gates being introduced into the existing PRS circuits, the reliability implications of the
proposed RPS circuit modifications have been reduced to those of the two solved problems
concerning the new introduced components.
4.1.2.3 Cost-benefit Considerations
The costs involved in the implementation of the proposed RPS modifications in a plant
may be categorized as follows:
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1. The establishment of the event-signal matrices and the identification of the validation-
validated signal pairs, over the range of anticipated plant conditions.
2. The design of the modifications of the RPS instrumentation.
3. The safety licensing needed in order to permit the implementation of the proposed
RPS modifications.
4. The operation and maintenance of the modified reactor protection system.
If an accurate computer program is used to establish the required event-signal matrices,
a reference plant can be chosen as the example upon which to focus all of the initial
analyses. The other similarly designed plants can modify the analyses from the reference
plant in order to fit their own specific designs. In fact, this is the typical practice used to
eliminate the duplication of work and also duplicated costs among the members of different
plant Owner's Groups. The design of the needed hardware modifications and the safety
licensing of the proposed logic circuit changes can also be standardized in like manner, if it
is so desired.
One of the merits of the proposed RPS circuit modifications is that not any setpoint of
the existing reactor protection as well as of the control systems is required to be changed.
The proposed RPS circuit modifications are used to validate the reactor shutdown signals
by means of the accompanying signals which precede the shutdown signals in occurrence.
The AND gates added into the existing PRS stop the spurious reactor shutdown signals
from being forwarded to the downstream reactor shutdown actuation circuit. Since no
signal setpoint in the existing systems has been changed in the development of the
proposed circuit modifications, the results of the safety analyses remain unchanged for a
plant which would implement the proposed RPS modification. No new safety issue is
expected to be involved in order to implement the RPS circuit modifications. As one would
expect, the licensing process for a design change without having the results of the safety
analyses of the plant changed is more promising than that having the analysis results being
changed.
Compared to the amount of installed logic gates and connecting wires in the existing
reactor protection system, the added logic gates only account for an increase of the order of
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a few percent. The work for this design change is not complicated. The maintenance of the
modified system is not expected to impose much a burden upon a plant either, since the
modification does not introduce components of types other than those used in the existing
system.
The safety licensing cost for this kind of design chang for a member of the Owener's
Group may be of the order of $ 0.1 million. This is the amount of money which the Taiwan
Power Company, a member of the Westinghouse Owner's Group, paid in 1988 to the
Westinghouse Electric Co. for the costs of safety licensing and hardware supplies for the
installation of the ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) in the Maanshan
Nuclear Power Station [32]. The AMSAC is used to actuate the mitigation systems should
a PWR plant encounter an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) situation. The safety
licensing costs for the proposed RPS circuit modifications should be of the same order as
that of the AMSAC, although the costs of safety liecensing vary among different topics.
Other information concerning how much the safety licensing costs would be can be drawn
from the budgets the Westinghouse Owner's Group has allocated for differenr topics.
These range from several hundred thousands to millions of dollars for different topics [33].
As is estimated in Chapter 1, aside from the other safety impacts, the financial loss is in
the order of $ 2 million for every reactor shutdown. For those which are avoiddable these
expenses are pure waste. To estimate the cost-benefit of the proposed circuit modifications,
assume that a reactor has twenty more years to operate, with an average number of
unintended reactor shutdowns due to spurious RPS signals of 0.3 per reactor year. Then
the ratio of the marginal benefit to the marginal costs of the employment of the proposed
RPS circuit modifications can be calculated by
marginal benefits -(0.3 shutdown per year)x(20 years)x($ 2 million per shutdown)
- $12 million
marginal costs - $ 0.1 million
ratio of marginal benefits / costs - ($12 million) / 0.1 million - 120 !
The costs of the analyses for identifying the validating signals and the expenditures for
the design of needed hardware modifications are trivial. However, a reduction of the
number of unintended reactor shutdown due to spurious signals or operation errors offers a
promising opportunity for improving plant safety and econonic performance.
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4.2. The Importance Rankings Among the Automatic Reactor
Shutdown Signals
The event-signal matrices also provide "importance" rankings among the reactor
shutdown signals. A reactor shutdown signal which occurs more frequently, and therefore
assumes more responsibility for protecting the reactor, is more important than a less
frequent one. The event-signal matrices established here provide an exact reactor shutdown
signal for each given event. This is not the case in the ordinary safety analyses where the
shutdown signal for a given event is always ambiguous [18]. Therefore we can use the
established event-signal matrices to estimate the relative frequencies, and hence the
importance rankings, among the reactor shutdown signals for protecting the reactor. This
section illustrates the estimation of the importance rankings among the reactor shutdown
signals based upon the event-signal matrices established in Chapter 3. Some potential
applications of the importance rankings are also discussed here.
4.2.1 The Estimation of the Reactor Shutdown Signal Importance
Rankings
The estimation of the occurrence frequencies of the reactor shutdown signals is
straightforward for a plant if the frequencies the events in the event-signal matrices have
been estimated, such as is performed in the Level-i Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).
The expected frequency, Ps, that a given reactor shutdown signal "S" is generated to
protect the reactor is simply the summation of the occurrence frequencies Pe of the events
in which the reactor is shutdown by the given signal. That is
Ps = XPei, where i denotes the i-th event in which the reactor is shutdown by the
i
given signal
As an illustration, if the occurrence frequencies of the events in the event-signal
matrices established in Chapter 3 are assumed to be equal (this is not true, of course), then
the relative frequency of a given shutdown signal shutting down the reactor is simply its
total number of appearance on all the event-signal matrices. The total numbers of times that
the reactor shutdown signals appear on the event-signal matrices, shown in Tables 3.4 to
3.10, are listed as follows:
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Reactor Shutdown Signal
OTDT-H-T 21
OPDT-H-T 0
Rx-Pwr-H-T 6
PZR-P-H-T 12
PZR-P-L-T 8
PZR-L-H-T 0
SG-L-LL-T 14
SG-L-H-T 7
Rx-Pwr-NR-H-T 7
Rx-Pwr-PR-H-T 7
RCS-F-L-T 14
T/B-T 14
It is seen that these relative usage frequencies differ from each other significantly
among the reactor shutdown signals, with the OTDT-H-T signal counted to a maximum of
21 occurrences but the OPDT-H-T and the PZR-L-H-T signals not appearing. It is obvious
that the OTDT-H-T shutdown function assumes much more responsibility for shutting
down the reactor than does either the OPDT-H-T or the PZR-L-H-T signal.
4.2.2 The Applications of the Reactor Shutdown Signal Importance
Rankings
The expected frequencies of reactor shutdowns by the automatic shutdown signals are
very useful to know. Use of more signals not only can provide more complete knowledge
for understanding the role in assuring the reactor safety of the reactor shutdown signals
which would be provided by the shutdown signal importance rankings. They could also
help in plants decisions for allocating limited resources. Furthermore, the operation and
maintenance of the reactor protection system may be adjusted based upon the reactor
shutdown signal importance rankings.
As is discussed in Chapter 3, the control systems of a nuclear power plant are normally
assumed to be inoperable for the purposes of safety analyses. But in reality most if not all,
of the control systems of the plant will be operable. One may obtain a biased understanding
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of this from the ordinary safety analyses of which are the more important shutdown
signals. The event-signal matrices established here provide a complete set of reactor
shutdown signals for different events in every different plant condition. This is not done in
the ordinary safety analyses, where the shutdown signal for a given event is always
ambiguous. Therefore one may obtain a clear understanding of how the plant will behave
and what the roles of the reactor shutdown signals are in shutting down the plant should an
accidental event occur.
Although there are always uncertainties in the analyses, the shutdown signal importance
rankings still provide valuable guidance for allocating the resources and adjusting the plants
operational and maintenance requirements. for example, the Limiting Conditions for
Operation specified in the Technical Specifications [16] for different reactor shutdown
signals could be treated separately based upon their importance values. The surveillance
frequencies, maintenance arrangements, and the schedules for component replacement for
different reactor shutdown signals could also be adjusted based on their safety significance
values. Even the instrumentation for a shutdown signal could be strengthen if its associated
risk were found to be unacceptable.
In the case of the work reported here, for example, it is found that the OTDT-H-T
reactor shutdown signal appears most frequently based upon the signal-event matrices.
Especially when some of the control systems are disabled, the OTDT-H-T signal has a
good chance to serve as the shutdown signal which actually shuts down the reactor. In this
situation, we may want the allowed outage time (AOT) for this shutdown function to be
more stringent than that for other shutdown signals. Similarly, the surveillance frequency
and the maintenance schedule for the shutdown circuit of the OTDT-H-T signal could also
be adjusted to be commensurate with its importance and therefore to enhance the plant
safety.
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4.3 The Validation of the Safety Injection Signal due to the Steam
Line Pressure-Low Signal
The signal validation technique based upon system interactions proposed here may be
applied in areas where the system interactions can be explicitly identified. The following
discussion first depicts the Safety Injection (SI) system, then illustrates the unintended SI
signal caused by the closure of a main steam isolation valve (MSIV), then finally describes
the validation of the SI signal as an example of this application.
4.3.1 The Impact of an Unintended Safety Injection
A high pressure safety injection ( or emergency core cooling) system is actuated in a
loss of coolant accident or in a steam line break accident. During the safety injection
process, the highly concentrated boric acid solution at ambient temperature is injected into
the RCS in order to limit or prevent further core damage. The safety injection system is
extremely important for reactor safety. However, if incorrectly actuated, it can cause a
serious thermal shock in pipes and nozzles as a result of introducing the injected cold water
into the high temperature fluid system. Furthermore, it would take a long time, typically
one to three days, depend upon the core life, in order to dilute the injected highly
concentrated boric acid to a level which would allow the plant to restartup, particularly
when the reactor core is near to its end of life. When the reactor core is at its end of life, the
boric acid concentration is much lower than that at the beginning of core life. Much more
water is needed in order to dilute a given amount of boric acid at the end of core life than is
at the beginning of core life. A large amount of waste will also be generated in the process
of boric acid dilution. Storing and shipping this waste is also a burden for the plant.
Therefore the impact of an unintended safety injection to a nuclear power plant is far more
serious than that of an automatic reactor shutdown in many aspects. Thus, it can be
valuable to avoid an unintended actuation of the safety injection system.
4.3.2 The Unintended Safety Injection due to a MSIV's Closure
Should the steam line break, the steam line pressure-low signal will initiate the closure
of all the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) in order to prevent uncontrolled blowdown
of all steam generators. Nevertheless, the closure of a MSIV during normal power
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operation will conversely generate the steam line pressure-low signal and initiate an
unintended safety coolant injection, as explained below.
The steam pressure transmitters in a Westinghouse-PWR plant are typically located
inside the steam tunnels, where it is possible for them to experience adverse environmental
conditions during a steam line break accident. Therefore the sensed pressure is
compensated by a typical lead/lag ratio of 50/5 in order to cope with the adverse
environmental instrument uncertainties. This high lead/lag ratio circuit will extrapolate the
sensed steam pressure variation and generate a steam pressure signal which is about equal
to the expected pressure which would occur 45 seconds in advance of real time. When one
of the MSIVs closes , the steam line upon which it is seated on is terminated, and the total
steam flow to the main turbine is suddenly decreased. Sensing the plunge of the inlet steam
flow, the turbine control system, trying to maintain the turbine power, will open all of the
control valves to their maximum openings. If the reactor is operating above a certain power
level, the opening of the turbine control valves decreases the steam line pressure in a
manner essentially equivalent to that of a steam line break event. Since the steam pressure
drops dramatically, the lead/lag compensation circuits, with the large lead/lag ratio of 50/5,
enlarge the pressure drop by about 10 times of the actual pressure drop. This compensated
pressure signal quickly reaches the steam line pressure-low setpoint, and thus, induces a
safety injection signal. However, this SI is undesirable since the transient will soon be
terminated by reactor shutdown on S/G-level-low low trip (S/G-L-LL-T) signal. The S/G-
L-LL-T signal is generated when the steam generator upstream of the fail-closed MSIV
encounters a water level shrinkage causing by the steam pressure increase after the MSIV's
closure [28].
The MSIVs are designed to be fail-closed, and are located at the open space between the
containment and the turbine building. The fail-closure of a MSIV is not unusual with the
MSIV's being located in such adverse environmental conditions. Subsequently, the
unintended safety coolant injection occurring due to the fail-closure of a MSIV is not
unusual either. A nuclear power plant with a fail-closed MSIV will be automatically shut
down as is discussed above. However, a safety coolant injection is not at all required, and
is economically as well as technically harmful.
4.3.3 The Elimination of the Unintended Safety Injection
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It is undesirable to generate the steam line pressure-low signal, which in turn will
induce the SI signal, arising from the closure of a MSIV when the reactor power exceeds a
certain "threshold" level. If it is the closure of the MSIV that generates the steam line
pressure-low signal, then the MSIV-closure signal will precede the steam line pressure-low
signal. If the steam line pressure-low signal is generated by a steam line break, then the
MSIV-closure signal will lag behind the steam line pressure-low signal, since it is the steam
line pressure-low signal that initiates the MSIV closure. Therefore we may use the MSIV
closure signal as an interlock to validate the steam line pressure-low signal, and, in turn,
the SI signal. This interlock permits the steam line pressure-low signal to actuate the SI
signal only if no MSIV is closed previously and the reactor is operating above the threshold
power level.
As is shown in Figure 4.3, the logic modification needed for eliminating the unintended
SI caused by the closure of the MSIV is straightforward. Only two AND gates and one NO
gate are added into the existing circuit. When the reactor is operating above the threshold
power level and there is any one MSIV closed, the AND gate upstream the NO gate will
send a positive signal to the NO gate. The NO gate then will send a negative signal to the
downstream AND gate and prevent the steam line pressure-low signal from being
forwarded to actuate SI and MSIV isolation. On the contrary, a positive signal from the NO
gate means that all of the MSIVs are in open condition and the reactor is operating above
the threshold power level, and therefore allows the steam line pressure-low to initiate the
safety coolant injection. When the reactor is operating at a power level less than the
threshold power, the NO gate will send a positive signal to the downstream AND gate.
This simply resumes the function of the modified circuit back to that of the original circuit,
and provides the SI and MSIV isolation functions for steam line break event when the
reactor is operating at a low power level or is in hot stand-by condition.
The required circuit modification for SI signal validation is expected to be simple,
effective and low-cost. It also prevents the unintended SI in an on-line fashion. Since not
setpoint has been changed for the purposes of the SI signal validation, it is expected that the
benefits from implementing the required circuit modification will outweigh the associated
costs.
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Figure 4.3. The Logic Modification for Eliminating Unintended Safety Injection
Due to MSIV's closure.
The NO gate is used to generated a negative output whenever there is any
one MSIV closed before a SI signal is generated when the reactor is operating
above the threshold power. This allows the elimination of the spurious SI
signals arising from the MSIV's closures.
The NO gate generated a positive output in order to allow the Steam Line
Pressure-Low signal actuating the safety coolant injection and MSIV isolation,
if the SI signals are not caused by the MSIV's closures.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
5.1 Summary
In the work reported here, a Westinghouse 4-loop PWR is chosen for examination in
order to demonstrate the concept of the reactor protection signal validation based on the
effects of systems interactions. The systems interactions and the occurrence of signals
during the postulated transients are simulated using the PRISM code. Based upon the
simulations, a set of event-signal matrices corresponding to different plant conditions are
constructed. From the constructed event-signal matrices, the signals that will lead a certain
automatic reactor shutdown signal in appear in each anticipatory event are identified. These
leading signals can be used to validate the reactor shutdown signals. The criteria set forth in
this work for selecting the leading signals as the validation signal are as follows:
1. To avoid common cause failure, the validating signals and the shutdown signal to be
validated can not share the same sensors or support systems.
2. Whenever there is a common signal leading different reactor shutdown signals in
occurrence, it should be preferentially chosen for use in order to reduce the scale of circuit
modifications as well as the subsequent operating costs.
3. The validating signals should survive any credible operation condition of the plant.
The validating-validated signal pairs selected according to these criteria are listed in
Table 3.11. One of the merits of the RPS signal validation is that not any setpoint of the
existing reactor protection as well as control systems is required to be changed.
Although some of the identified processes of shutdown signal validation may be
dependent upon the reactor power level, the work reported here shows that only one set of
signal validation circuits is adequate for use at any reactor power level. The RPS logic
modification based upon the identified signal pairs is expected to be simple, reliable, low-
cost. It provides an on-line means of prevention of unintended reactor shutdowns without
any signal setpoint having to be changed.
The costs involved in the implementation of the proposed RPS modifications in a plant
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is not expected to be too high as a result of the following two reasons:
1. Since not any signal setpoint in the existing systems has been changed in the
development of the proposed circuit modifications, the results of the safety analyses remain
unchanged for a plant which would implement the proposed RPS modification. No new
safety issue is expected to be involved in order to implement the RPS circuit modifications.
As one would expect, the licensing process for a design change without having the results
of the safety analyses of the plant been changed is more promising than that with having the
analysis results been changed.
2. If an accurate computer code is used to establish the required event-signal matrices, a
reference plant can be chosen as the example upon which to focus all of the initial analyses.
The other similarly designed plants can modify the analyses from the reference plant in
order to fit their own specific designs. In fact, this is the typical practice used to eliminate
the duplication of work and also duplicated cost among the members of different plant
Owner's Groups. The design of the hardware modifications and the licensing of the
proposed logic circuit changes can also be standardized in like manner, with the costs being
shared by the joint members, if it is so desired.
The signal validation technique proposed here is estimated to be highly cost-effective,
with a marginal economic benefit/cost ratio in the order of $12 million/ 0.1 million for a
plant with twenty more years to operate. In additional to the economic benefits, there are
other benefits resulting from less thermal hydraulic impacts upon the plant, less challenges
to the safety systems of the plant, less possible NRC investigations and the subsequent
possible reactor shutdowns, etc.
The event-signal matrices established here provide an complete set of exact reactor
shutdown signals for different events in every different plant condition. Therefore one may
obtain a clear understanding in how the plant will behave and what are the roles of the
reactor shutdown signals in shutting down the plant, should an event occur.
Other information drawn from the event-signal matrices is the importance ranking
among the reactor shutdown signals. Although there are always uncertainties in the
analyses, the shutdown signal importance rankings are still a good guidance for allocating
the resources and adjusting the operation and maintenance requirements. The Limiting
Conditions for Operation specified in the Technical Specifications for different reactor
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shutdown signals could be treated separately based upon their importance. The surveillance
frequencies, maintenance arrangements, and the schedules for component replacement for
different reactor shutdown signals could also be adjusted based upon their safety
significance values. The instrumentation for a shutdown signal could also be strengthened
if the associated risk is found to be unacceptable.
The signal validation based upon system interactions is expected to be applicable in any
areas where the system interactions can be explicitly identified. In the work described here,
the validation of the safety injection signal arising from MSIV's closure is demonstrated as
an example of the application.
5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations
The signal validation technique based upon system interactions is found to have the
characteristics as follows:
1. It can prevent unintended incidents, such as spurious reactor shutdown, spurious
safety coolant injection, from being occurred in an on-line fashion.
2. No setpoint in the plant has to be changed in order to employ the required RPS
modification based upon this signal validation technique.
3. The results of the safety analyses remain unchanged, the safety licensing for the
application of the technique is not expected to be difficult.
4. The required RPS circuit modification is expected to be simple, reliable, compatible
to the existing systems, and having no adverse effect on the plants.
As a result of the above characteristics, the signal validation technique proposed here is
estimated to be highly cost-effective, with a marginal economic benefit/cost ratio in the
order of $12 million/ 0.1 million for a plant with twenty more years to operate. In
additional to the direct economic benefits, there are other benefits resulting from less
thermal hydraulic impacts upon the plant, less challenges to the safety systems of the plant,
and less possible NRC investigations and the subsequent plant shutdowns, etc.
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Based upon the generally satisfactory results in signal validations as well as in
operational improvements of the work reported here, it is recommended that the signal
validation method based upon system interactions be further investigated by using more
accurate computer codes, with the effects arising from the factors such as power level, core
bum-up, plant specific setpoints, etc., should be incorporated into simulations.
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